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DISTORTED DRUG PATENTS 
Erika Lietzan* 
Kristina M.L. Acri née Lybecker** 
Abstract: Drug patents are distorted. Unlike most other inventors, drug inventors must 
complete ears of testing to the government s specifications and seek government approval to 
commercialize their inventions. All the while, the patent term runs. When a drug inventor 
finally launches a medicine that embodies the invention, only a fraction of the patent life 
remains. And yet, conventional wisdom holds and empirical studies show that patent life 
is essential to innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, perhaps more so than any other 
inventive industry. Congress tried to address this in 1984, authorizing the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) to restore  a portion of the patent term lost to premarket testing. The 
PTO does not restore all of the lost time, though, which raises the question whether the U.S. 
legal system may steer researchers away from drugs that take a long time to develop. This 
Article focuses on that question. It examines every grant of patent term restoration for a new 
drug or biologic from the scheme s 1984 enactment to April 1, 2018. Few scholars have 
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considered patent term restoration from an empirical perspective, none has used a dataset of 
this size and scope, and none has addressed the questions this Article addresses. Two 
significant conclusions stand out. First, longer clinical programs lead to shorter effective patent 
life, even after the PTO has granted patent term restoration. The results are strongly statistically 
significant and contribute to a growing body of literature raising the alarm that the U.S. legal 
system may be systematically skewing drug research incentives away from the harder 
problems such as a cure for Al heimer s Disease and interventions at the earl  stages of 
cancers. Second, Congress decided to allow drug companies to apply patent term restoration 
to continuation patents, specifically because this would increase the chances of reaching 
fourteen years of effective patent life. Ten years later Congress changed the way patent terms 
are calculated without considering the effect on patent term restoration. Selecting a 
continuation patent no longer has the same effect. Today a drug company is most likely to 
achieve the fourteen years of effective patent life by securing a new, original patent that issues 
late in clinical trials. Policymakers and scholars complain when companies secure these later-
expiring patents, but the findings in this Article suggest those patents may be necessary to 
accomplish what Congress intended in 1984. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New drugs are famously expensive and can remain so for years, until 
Acri & Lietzan 08 Lietzan and Acri-10-27(Do Not Delete) 10/27/2020  4:49 PM 
2020] DISTORTED DRUG PATENTS 1319 
 
copies become available.1 Concern about their prices and the wait for 
cheaper copies has sparked legislative hearings and policy proposals over 
the years including, recently, suggestions that the government impose 
price controls or even strip drug companies of their patent rights.2 These 
proposals implicate another significant public policy challenge: that we 
still lack effective treatments for many serious diseases. We have no 
meaningful treatment for Al heimer s Disease, for instance, even though 
ten percent of the U.S. population aged sixty-five or older has been 
diagnosed with Al heimer s dementia, and the number of sufferers is 
projected to reach 7.1 million by 2025.3 Many cancers such as 
pancreatic cancer, diffuse intrinsic pontine glioma, and glioblastoma 
multiforme remain essentially untreatable.4 And many chronic diseases, 
though treated, continue to exact a toll.5 Better treatments for these 
conditions are needed. 
The two issues the high price of new drugs, and the need for new 
drugs are intertwined. The U.S. legal system stimulates the invention 
and development of new drugs in part by promising a period of exclusivity 
in the market, which is attractive because it provides an opportunity to 
charge higher prices during the period.6 This exclusivity is made possible 
                                                     
1. This Article uses new drugs  to refer to both (1) new drugs approved under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), and (2) biological products that are new drugs but, because also 
biological, licensed under the Public Health Service Act. See infra section I.A. It refers to both generic 
drugs and biosimilar biologics as copies  for convenience. See infra note 67. 
2. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price be Evergreen, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 590 (2018) 
(proposing that drug companies be limited to one patent or period of exclusivity); Hannah Brennan et 
al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 275 (2016) (arguing that the U.S. government should invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to 
authorize generic manufactures to produce patented drugs, without permission of the patent owner, 
subject to reasonable compensation ); S. 1416, 116th Cong.  27(b)(1) (2019) (proposing to presume 
it an unfair method of competition in or affecting commerce  to obtain certain additional later-
expiring patents in the same patent family or portfolio as an already issued patent that claims an 
approved drug).  
3. ALZHEIMER S ASS N, 2018 ALZHEIMER S DISEASE FACTS AND FIGURES 17, 22 (2018). 
4. See, e.g., Ho-Shin Gwak & Hyeon Jin Park, Developing Chemotherapy for Diffuse Pontine 
Intrinsic Gliomas (DIPG), 120 CRITICAL REVS. ONCOLOGY/HEMATOLOGY 111, 111 (2017) (noting 
median survival rate of ten months after radiation). 
5. Ten years ago, researchers at the Milken Institute estimated that seven chronic diseases cancer, 
heart disease, hypertension, mental disorders, diabetes, pulmonary conditions, and stroke together 
affect more than 109 million Americans, with a total impact on the economy of $1.3 trillion annually. 
Ross DeVol & Armen Bedroussian, An Unhealthy America: The Economic Burden of Chronic 
Disease, 24 MED. BENEFITS 1, 1 2 (2007). 
6. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977); see also Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. 
L. REV. 503, 508 (2009) ( Without some wa  to dela  generic competition . . . pharmaceutical 
companies would usually find it impossible to recoup their R&D investments and would likely invest 
their money elsewhere. With strong patent protection, however, firms can expect to enjoy a lengthy 
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in part by the protection of patents associated with those new drugs.7 
Patent protection ensures that an inventor can enjoy a period during which 
others cannot make or sell copies of the invention.8 The patent permits a 
temporary high price for the resulting new drug, and it thus encourages 
innovation.9 Although there is disagreement on the matter, many conclude 
that we cannot have the one (the innovation, meaning the drug) without 
                                                     
monopol  over their drugs, providing them an opportunit  to profit from their investment in R&D. ).  
7. It is also made possible in part by the data exclusivity  provisions of the two drug approval 
statutes. During the data exclusivity period, other companies may not rely in their own applications 
on the research generated and submitted by an inventor to support approval of its drug. See, e.g., 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (providing that generic applications cannot be submitted until five years after 
approval of a new drug with a new active ingredient, or four years in the case of a patent challenge). 
There may be other ways to stimulate the invention and development of new drugs. See, e.g., 
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003) (assessing a variety of 
proposed pri e  s stems in which the government pa s monetar  compensation and recommending 
a flexible, retrospective  system administered by an administrative agency); Michael R. Kremer, 
Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1146 48 (1998) 
(considering a mechanism in which the government offers to purchase patents at their private value, 
determined using an action, adjusted by a markup to cover the difference between the patent s social 
value and its private value); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation 
9 18 (Univ. Calgary, Inst. of Health Econs., Working Paper, 2004) (proposing a system in which 
innovators are rewarded by direct payment from a government-financed fund based on the 
incremental therapeutic benefits  of their innovation); Kristina M. Lybecker & Robert A. Freeman, 
Funding Pharmaceutical Innovation Through Direct Tax Credits, 2 HEALTH ECONS. POL Y & L. 267, 
270 71 (2007) (proposing as an alternative to the current patent system an approach of rewarding 
innovators with direct tax credits in exchange for marginal cost pricing ); James Love & Tim 
Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 
1528 34 (2007) (recommending that the government award innovators with large prizes tied to the 
actual impact of the drug on healthcare outcomes); Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription 
Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 201 08 (2016) (proposing a 
change to the government health insurance program for low-income individuals, Medicaid, to reward 
innovators who bring to market drugs for diseases primarily affecting low-income populations). 
8. See generally infra section I.B. There is debate in the literature about whether patents promote 
not only invention (discovery) but also post-invention development efforts. Compare Kitch, supra 
note 6, at 276 (arguing that early-issued patents give their owners an incentive to make investments 
to maximi e the value of the patent ), with Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications 
for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (disputing Kitch s prospect theor  and 
notion that a single compan  is better positioned than the market to make efficient use of an idea ). 
This debate does not affect the point made in the text. The point is that without the promise of a period 
of exclusivity in the market, the prospect of competition will deter investment in the post-invention 
research and development needed to commercialize a new drug.  
9. Patent protection for new drugs has its limitations, however. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The 
Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 19 HEALTH AFFS. 119, 122 28 (2001) 
(pointing out shortcomings of patent-based exclusivity for new drugs, including the possibility of 
patents held by third parties for prior discoveries that may be essential to development of the drug in 
question and increasing public hostility to patents due to rising health care costs); Yaniv Heled, Why 
Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should Be Unenforceable Against Generic Applicants Under the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 211 (2012) (suggesting that 
patents for biologics products are vulnerable to workarounds). 
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the other (the encouragement to innovate, and thus a temporarily high 
price).10 What remains is the question of balancing: how much exclusivity 
in the market is needed for the optimal amount of medical innovation.11 
This Article focuses on the relationship between the patent incentive 
and drug innovation, adding an empirical dimension relating to the length 
of drug patents that has been lacking in the scholarship to date. It focuses 
on the fact that the patent incentive does not work the same way for drugs 
as it does for other inventions, because a separate body of federal law bars 
the inventor from marketing the invention for sometimes half or even 
more of the patent life. That is, federal regulator  requirements distort  
the patent.12 
Since the early twentieth century, federal law has required the sellers 
of drugs to test their products and seek the government s permission 
before launching.13 A new drug must be proven safe and effective for a 
particular medical use.14 Satisfying this standard entails laboratory and 
                                                     
10. See Roin, supra note 6, at 508 ( Although the public suffers from high prices for drugs while 
they are covered by a patent, most of those drugs probably would not have been developed without 
that protection. As a result, it is widely thought that the benefits of drug patents far outweigh their 
costs. ); see also Kristina M.L. Acri, Economic Growth and Prosperity Stem from Effective 
Intellectual Property Rights, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 868 (2017) ( Without patent protection, 
and other forms of intellectual propert  rights to protect an innovator s investment, pharmaceutical 
drug development will not take place. ); F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry–Prices and 
Progress, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 927, 927 (2004) ( Numerous cross-industry surveys have shown 
that managers of pharmaceutical research and development assign unusually great importance to 
patent protection as a means of recouping their investment in research, development, and testing. ). 
11. There is extensive theoretical literature analyzing optimal patent term, dating to Professor 
Nordhaus s seminal work in 1969, with which this Article does not engage. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, 
INVENTION GROWTH, AND WELFARE; A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76 
(1969) (proposing that optimal patent length balances the tradeoff between eliciting activity that 
would not otherwise have occurred, on the one hand, and giving monopoly protection to inventions 
that would have been shared with society anyway, on the other hand). There is less empirical literature 
on the subject. See Eric Budish et al., Patents and Research Investments: Assessing the Empirical 
Evidence, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 183, 183 (2016) (reviewing the surprisingl  small . . . body of 
empirical evidence  assessing the elasticit  of investment with respect to patent term length). 
Recently, however, some have argued that patent terms should be tailored to field of invention or to 
time to market. See, e.g., Eric Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence 
from Cancer Clinical Trials 1 (Stan. Inst. Econ. Pol  Rsch., Discussion Paper No. 13-001, 2013), 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/heidi.paper__6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9WVE-W3JC] (suggesting that with fixed patent terms, research and development 
is distorted awa  from technologies with long time lags between invention and commerciali ation ); 
Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 672, 673 (2014) (arguing that time to market is a uniquel  powerful indicator of the optimal 
patent strength for different t pes of inventions ).  
12. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990). 
13. See generally infra section I.A. 
14. See infra section I.A. 
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animal ( preclinical ) testing as well as several phases of human 
( clinical ) trials. The federal government s gatekeeping mechanism 
protects public health by ensuring that new drugs are, on average, more 
beneficial than harmful for the patients for whom they are intended.15 But 
gatekeeping comes at a price: the research required by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) is not only expensive and time consuming, 
but risky.16 The inventor must make an enormous investment, without 
knowing whether the drug will succeed in trials (or for what indication, 
exactly), without knowing when the trials will be completed and the drug 
approved, and without knowing whether (if approved) the drug will be 
commercially successful.17 
Distortion of the patent term stems from the fact that drug inventors 
usually file their first patent applications before they start testing in 
humans.18 This generally means that the patents issue before the trials are 
done and before approval of the drug. And while the premarket testing 
continues, the patent life runs. By the time the federal government permits 
the inventor to commercialize the invention, much of the patent term has 
lapsed. The years that remain are the effective  life of the patent the 
years during which the inventor may lawfully exploit the invention in the 
market, without others also using the invention. The irony for inventors 
of new drugs is that drugs requiring more premarket investment (more 
years of research) may enjoy less patent life at the end of the day. 
The problem grew worse in the 1960s and 1970s as the federal 
regulatory framework grew more demanding.19 In 1984, Congress 
responded to this fact, and to data showing a decline in drug innovation, 
with an amendment to the Patent Act.20 As a result the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) now restores a portion of the drug patent term 
lost to premarket research and development and FDA review.21 But it does 
not restore all of the time lost. It restores only half of the clinical testing 
time (after the patent issues), and it caps the recovery at five years, no 
matter how long clinical trials and FDA approval take. This means that 
                                                     
15. See Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 857 (2017); see also Erika 
Lietzan, Access Before Evidence and the Price of the FDA s New Drug Authorities, 53 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1243, 1249 54 (2019). 
16. See infra section I.A.  
17. See infra section I.A and sources cited note 54. 
18. See infra section I.B. 
19. See infra section I.C and sources cited note 83.  
20. See infra section I.C; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 
U.S.C.). 
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
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after a certain point, premarket research and development simply 
translates into lost patent life. The statute also limits the patent to fourteen 
years of life after drug approval, meaning that the restored patent may not 
expire later than the fourteen- ear anniversar  of FDA s approval of 
the drug. 
As a regulator  matter, the length of a drug s premarket clinical 
program mostly reflects factors outside the control of the company 
developing the drug.22 Moreover, some types of drugs consistently take 
longer in premarket research and development.23 These findings raise the 
question whether given the patent term restoration formula the U.S. 
legal system systematically under-encourages particular areas of 
medical research.24 
This Article continues that research with an expanded dataset, 
examining empirically the relationship between research and 
development timelines, on the one hand, and effective patent life (the time 
from FDA approval to patent expiry), on the other hand. Few scholars 
have considered patent term restoration from an empirical perspective, 
none has used a dataset of this size and scope, and none has addressed the 
questions this Article addresses.25 
The dataset relates to 642 approved drugs (including biologics) for 
which a patent was restored. This comprises every grant of patent term 
restoration for a drug between enactment of the statute in September 1984 
and April 1, 2018, when data collection ended. Four conclusions from the 
                                                     
22. See infra section I.A. 
23. See infra section I.A. 
24. One recent study found that firms under-invest in the development of cancer drugs that require 
long-term trials. Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from 
Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2047 (2015). 
25. The two significant empirical pieces to date differ from this Article in scope and focus. First, 
in 2018, Professors Beall, Darrow, and Kesselheim published an examination of patent term 
restoration for the 170 best-selling new drugs that experienced generic market entry between 2000 
and 2012. Reed F. Beall et al., Patent Term Restoration for Top-Selling Drugs in the United States, 
24 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 20 (2019). The Beall dataset is smaller than the dataset for this Article, 
which includes all patent term restoration grants for drugs and biologics between enactment of the 
statute in 1984 and April 1, 2018, and which includes additional variables discussed in Part III. 
Parts III and IV discuss the findings in the Beall paper. Second, in 2014, Jaime Cárdenas-Navia 
presented an analysis of all patents extended by the PTO between enactment in 1984 and December 
31, 2013. Jaime F. Cardenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and Economic 
Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1302, 1315 (2015). 
This Article does not consider the Cardenas-Navia findings, because his dataset includes not only 
human drugs and biologics, but also medical devices, food additives, and animal drugs. Each is subject 
to a different premarket review paradigm (for instance, food additives do not go through effectiveness 
testing), and the formulas governing patent term restoration differ. Several other pieces in the legal, 
economic, or policy literature offer less comprehensive empirical examinations of patent term 
restoration; we discuss some below, where relevant. See sources cited infra notes 146 and 150.  
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analysis stand out. 
First, a longer clinical period is associated with a shorter final effective 
patent life (meaning after restoration), and a longer period between patent 
filing and start of clinical trials is associated with a shorter final effective 
patent life.26 Although the magnitude of the impact is small, the results 
are strongly statistically significant, confirming the hypothesis that longer 
premarket research and development programs lead to shorter effective 
patent life, even with patent term restoration. 
Second, application of the five-year cap on patent term restoration 
makes it less likely the final effective patent life will come close to the 
fourteen-year outer limit envisioned by Congress in 1984.27 Again, the 
magnitude of the impact is small, but the results strongly 
statistically significant. 
Third, there is generally no relationship between the therapeutic 
categor  in which a drug falls and the drug s final effective patent life.28 
Very few therapeutic category variables were statistically significant, and 
the statistically significant ones explained almost none of the variation in 
effective patent life. 
Fourth, certain aspects of the drug patent itself play an important role 
in determining its final effective patent life.29 In the 1990s Congress 
changed how patent terms are calculated.30 In 1984, a patent lasted for 
seventeen years from its issuance date.31 Now a patent lasts for twenty 
years from its application date.32 And if the patent relates to an earlier-
filed patent, the ( child ) patent term lasts for twent  ears from the 
earlier ( parent ) patent application date.33 In 1984 policymakers chose to 
permit restoration of child patents, because these patents issued and 
therefore (under the patent law at the time) expired later, and restoring 
them would lead to a longer effective patent life.34 When Congress 
changed the patent term in 1994, it did not consider the impact on patent 
term restoration.35 And in this dataset, when the twenty-year rule applies, 
                                                     
26. See infra section IV.A.  
27. See infra section IV.C. 
28. See infra section IV.B. 
29. See infra section IV.A. 
30. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 154, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983 
(1994). 
31. 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See infra section IV.A. 
35. See infra section IV.A. 
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having child  status decreases effective patent life the opposite of what 
lawmakers intended in 1984.36 
Together these findings suggest a conclusion that could have 
significant policy implications. Longer premarket trials mean shorter 
effective patent life but not by much. In 1984, policymakers chose to 
allow drug companies to select later-issued patents for patent term 
restoration. The ability to select a later-issued child patent for restoration 
may have therefore mitigated the distorting effect of the premarket 
regulatory regime. But Congress effectively undid the 1984 decision, ten 
years later, without reflection. The change has made it important for 
companies to pick later-issued original patents to achieve the same result 
as intended in 1984 fourteen years of effective patent life. But these 
patents generall  do not cover the drug s active ingredient; the  cover 
other aspects of the drug. Some scholars refer to non-active-ingredient 
drug patents as secondar  patents though they are simply patents, like 
any other and a growing body of literature criticizes these patents.37 But 
policymakers selected a fourteen-year target for effective patent life target 
in 1984, and the findings here suggest that later-issued and later-expiring 
original patents may now be essential to hitting that target. This Article 
takes no position on the optimal length of drug patents or the optimal 
period of exclusivity in the market for drugs, but the findings in this 
Article may have implications for scholars and policymakers who 
question the need for multiple patents covering the same product. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the tension between 
patent law and the drug approval framework in the United States, as well 
as the patent term restoration framework enacted to partially mitigate this 
tension. Part II describes the hypotheses that motivated this project. 
Part III describes the dataset and findings. These comprise descriptive 
statistics relating to effective patent life and the impact of patent term 
restoration on effective patent life, as well as the results of a series of 
regressions assessing the determinants of effective patent life. Part IV 
                                                     
36. See infra section IV.A. 
37. Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis 
of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2012) ( These patents are generally 
termed secondary because they are assumed to come later in the sequence of innovation, and to offer 
less robust protection than a chemical compound claim. We use the term not because we believe these 
patents to be necessarily of lesser importance or strength, but because the term is conventional in the 
literature, and among practitioners. ); C nthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A 
Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 313 17 (2015) (criticizing practice of 
securing secondar  patents and questioning their validit ); Feldman, supra note 2, at 601 
(examining and critici ing the practice of securing secondar  patents, on the theor  that it refreshes  
the monopoly protection on a drug). 
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discusses the economic and policy implications of the findings, and Part V 
concludes with thoughts about policy implications. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Firms considering the development of new drugs face both a distortion 
of their patents and a paradox.38 Federal law stimulates scientific progress 
by ensuring that innovators can enjoy a period of exclusivity in their 
inventions, meaning a period during which others may not make or sell 
the inventions without their permission.39 This period is made possible in 
part through the protection of patents, which last for a fixed period.40 But 
federal law also prohibits the sale of a new drug until the inventor has 
performed years of testing in humans and persuaded the government that 
the drug meets a particular regulatory standard of safety and 
effectiveness.41 This takes a variable amount of time sometimes only a 
few years, but sometimes a decade or more.42 This is patent distortion: 
mandatory testing wastes patent life, leaving inventors of regulated 
products less time (than other inventors) to commercialize their inventions 
without copies in the market. So long as the patent term starts before 
clinical testing ends, the longer clinical testing takes, the less patent life 
remains at the time of approval. This is the paradox: if a premarket testing 
program is more time-consuming, the U.S. legal system provides less of 
a reward to the inventor. This part describes the process of new drug 
approval, provides an overview of the patent and exclusivity incentives, 
and then explains the distortion of patent life and steps Congress took in 
1984 to address that distortion. 
A. New Drug and Biological Product Approval 
By the time a new drug reaches patients, it has been the subject of years 
of testing, as well as intense review by the FDA. Two federal statutes 
                                                     
38. See generally Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39 (2018). 
39. See infra section I.B.  
40. See infra section I.B. 
41. See infra section I.A. The logistics are more complex in practice. The inventor is a natural 
person. That natural person or an entity to which the person has assigned the invention (for instance, 
the inventor s employer) may apply for the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 118. In the case of a new drug, a 
company (such as the inventor s employer) generally performs or pays for this testing. This company 
is the drug s developer. The distinction between the natural person and the company is immaterial for 
the point in the text: a drug embodying the invention cannot be sold commercially until the testing is 
complete. This Article uses the term inventor  to refer to the individual and the company authorized 
by the inventor. 
42. See infra section I.A. 
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require premarket approval of new drugs: the Public Health Service Act 
(PHSA) requires that biological products (or biologics ) be licensed  
before they are marketed,43 and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA) requires that all other drugs be approved  before the  are 
marketed.44 This Article refers to both as drugs which they are45
unless it is important to distinguish between biological and non-biological 
drugs, and it refers to the marketing authori ation decision as approval.  
New drug research and development usually begins with the discovery 
or creation of a molecule with useful biological activity typically shown 
in tissues and in animal models.46 This molecule eventually becomes the 
active moiety (the molecule responsible for the therapeutic action of the 
drug) in a finished product for patients. The FDA does not approve active 
moieties, however, nor does it approve based on useful biological activity. 
Instead, it approves a finished product the active moiety in a formulation 
with inactive ingredients, with a particular route of administration, dosage 
form, and strength for specific conditions of use (a particular disease or 
disease state, following a particular dosing regimen, with other relevant 
instructions for use).47 The agency also approves labeling for prescribers 
that describes the approved conditions of use.48 The precise medical 
condition for which the drug is approved is known as the drug s 
indication,  and the product must be shown safe and effective for that 
indication under the conditions of use described in its labeling.49 
Developing the evidence of safety and effectiveness needed for 
approval is a multistep process that begins with laboratory and animal 
testing and proceeds through several phases of clinical trials. Trials in 
humans typically start with small safety tests in healthy subjects and move 
through additional phases of progressively larger trials with more 
ambitious goals.50 The process typically culminates in two randomized 
                                                     
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a). 
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
45. See id. § 321(g)(1) (defining drug ). 
46.  See ERLAND STEVENS, MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY: THE MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY PROCESS 
94 100 (1st ed. 2014); Bruce H. Littman, Translational Medicine: Definition, History, and Strategies, 
in TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE AND DRUG DISCOVERY 4 6 (Bruce H. Littman & Rajesh Krishna eds., 
2011).  
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also Lietzan, supra note 38, at 55 56. 
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
49. Id. 
50. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2019); REBECCA A. ENGLISH ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT L 
ACADS., FORUM ON DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSLATION: TRANSFORMING 
CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: WORKSHOP 
SUMMARY 24 26 (2010).  
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double-blinded controlled clinical trials, which are the gold standard for 
FDA approval.51 If these trials are large enough to permit meaningful 
conclusions, they can identify causal relationships proving that the drug 
is effective.52 Empirical studies consistently find that for a new molecule 
this process can take twelve years or more.53 The process is expensive and 
the outcome uncertain.54 
As a practical matter, the design and length of any particular premarket 
program depends on factors over which the developer has little control: 
the type of molecule at issue, its mechanism of action, the disease itself 
and the biological pathways it uses, the specific disease state targeted, the 
therapeutic outcome tested, and even the presence and nature of other 
                                                     
51. See Vinay Prasad & Vance Berger, Hard-Wired Bias: How Even Double-Blind, Randomized 
Controlled Trials Can Be Skewed from the Start, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1171 (2015) ( Well-
designed, adequately-powered randomized controlled trials . . . are rightfully considered the highest 
form of evidence on which to base treatment and diagnostic decisions, minimizing potential biases, 
particularl  confounding, that plague nonrandomi ed evidence. ). Double blinding means neither the 
patients nor the investigators know the assignments. Randomization and double blinding reduce the 
potential for both bias and confounding (unaccounted-for variables that are actually responsible for 
the outcome). See Thomas R. Frieden, Evidence for Health Decision Making—Beyond Randomized, 
Controlled Trials, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465, 466 71 (2017); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2019) 
(describing the design characteristics of an adequate and well-controlled trial); U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., FDA-1999-D-1874, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CHOICE OF CONTROL GROUP AND RELATED 
ISSUES IN CLINICAL TRIALS (2001) (describing nature and purpose of randomization, controls, and 
double-blinding). 
52. See Frieden, supra note 51, at 470. Smaller trials usually have wider confidence intervals 
around effectiveness meaning that the true value (actual effectiveness) could be anywhere within a 
larger range of numbers. See id. 
53. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug Development: Success 
Rates for Investigational Drugs, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 272 (2010) (noting 
that analyses across all therapeutic areas indicate that the development of a new drug, from target 
identification through approval for marketing, takes over twelve years and often much longer). 
54. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D 
Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016) (estimating average out-of-pocket cost per approved compound 
of $1.4 billion and total preapproval cost of $2.56 billion); Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data 
Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 107 08 (2016) (discussing range of estimates for the 
length of time and cost of developing a new drug); Chi Heem Wong et al., Estimation of Clinical 
Trial Success Rates and Related Parameters, 20 BIOSTATISTICS 273, 277 (2019) (examining over 
21,000 compounds in trials between January 1, 2000, and October 31, 2015, and finding that only 
13.8% of all drug development programs eventually lead to approval); Katarzyna Smietana et al., 
Trends in Clinical Success Rates, 15 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 379, 380 (2016) (examining 
approvals in 2012-2014 and finding that small molecule drugs had only a 9% chance of making it 
from initial trials to commercial launch, and biological drugs an 18% chance); Helen Dowden & 
Jamie Munro, Trends in Clinical Success Rates and Therapeutic Focus, 18 NATURE REVS. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 495, 495 (2019) (using data from 2015 to 2017 and finding the probability of launch from 
the start of clinical trials to be less than 10%); GOV T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-49, NEW 
DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES 
CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 25 (2006) (noting that clinical trial failure rates 
increased to 91% during the period 2000 through 2003). 
 
Acri & Lietzan 08 Lietzan and Acri-10-27(Do Not Delete) 10/27/2020  4:49 PM 
2020] DISTORTED DRUG PATENTS 1329 
 
treatments on the market.55 The developer has general choices such as 
whether to proceed and (perhaps) which of several potential indications 
to pursue (or pursue first) but much of the rest will be dictated by 
science, regulator  requirements, or the FDA s policies and preferences.56 
Certain therapeutic categories are, however, consistently associated with 
longer premarket clinical programs. One recent article examining 570 new 
drug applications (for non-biologic drugs) approved between August 1984 
and August 2016 found that antipsychotics, central nervous system 
agents, antidepressants, anticonvulsants, anti-Parkinson s agents, 
immunological agents, blood products, antiemetics, and antineoplastic 
agents were associated with longer clinical programs than non-biologic 
drugs in other therapeutic categories.57 
B. Patenting New Drugs and Biologics 
The primary incentive to discover and develop a new drug in the United 
States is the prospect of a period for exclusive marketing sales without 
competition from copycat products.58 Several features of federal law make 
                                                     
55. See Lietzan, supra note 38, at 62 77. 
56. See id. 
57. Id. at 101 02. The drugs in these therapeutic categories had average clinical testing periods 
exceeding the overall average of the dataset (5.96 years). See id. at 88; see also Erika Lietzan & 
Kristina M.L. Acri, The Innovation Paradox: Pharmaceutical Marketing Exclusivity and Incentives 
for Drug Development, 10 J. PHARM. HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 169 (2019) (discussing same results); 
TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., CNS DRUGS TAKE LONGER TO DEVELOP AND HAVE 
LOWER SUCCESS RATES THAN OTHER DRUGS 1 (2014) (finding that mean clinical development time 
for CNS drugs between 1999 and 2013 was 12.8 months, or 18%, longer than the mean time for other 
drugs); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., R&D Costs and Returns by Therapeutic Category, 38 DRUG INFO. J. 
211, 217 (2004) (finding that the mean overall time from the initiation of clinical testing to marketing 
approval is 32% below average for analgesic/anesthetic drugs, 30% below average for antiinfective 
drugs, 9% below average for cardiovascular drugs, and 27% above average for [central nervous 
s stem] drugs ). 
58. See sources cited supra note 6; see also Kristina M.L. Acri, Economic Growth and Prosperity 
Stems from Effective Intellectual Property Rights, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 868 (2017) ( Without 
patent protection, and other forms of intellectual propert  rights to protect an innovator s investment, 
pharmaceutical drug development will not take place. ); id. at 868 n.9 (listing scholars who have 
demonstrated that patents foster ex ante innovation, motivating the investment of time and talent 
because of the prospect of financial gain from those endeavors ); Fabian Gaessler & Stefan Wagner, 
Patents, Data Exclusivity, and the Development of New Drugs, 2018 ACAD. OF MGMT. PROC. 3 (2019) 
( Our . . . regression results indicate that a reduction in the overall duration of market exclusivity 
significantly affects project outcomes. In fact, we find that the loss of one year of market exclusivity 
lowers the likelihood of drug approval by about 3.5% relative to an unconditional approval rate of 
30.5%. ); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Determinants of Market Exclusivity for Prescription Drugs in 
the United States, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1658, 1659 (2017) ( In the pharmaceutical market, 
patents are considered essential to provide sufficient return on investment in drug development, which 
can take man  ears. ).  
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this period of exclusive sales possible, one of which is the protection of 
patents associated with the drug. 
Federal law permits a patent to issue for any new and useful, non-
obvious invention.59 An inventor submits a patent application to the PTO 
for examination, and after the examination process which may include 
communications between the applicant and examiner as well as 
amendments to the patent claims the PTO will either issue or reject the 
patent (in whole or in part).60 Sometimes however, the applicant will file 
another application relating to the same invention, citing the same subject 
matter (a continuation  application) or adding new subject matter (a 
continuation-in-part  application).61 In this Article, consistent with 
conventions in patent law, we refer to these two types of applications as 
parent (or original) applications and child applications and the resulting 
patents as parent (or original) patents, and child patents. In other 
situations, the patent examiner may conclude that the application 
describes more than one invention and may require that the applicant 
select only one to prosecute; in this case, the applicant may place the other 
inventions in separate divisional  applications.62 We refer to these, also, 
as child applications and the resulting patents as child patents. 
A new drug product may encompass several patentable inventions. 
These usuall  include the product s active ingredient, which is the 
component intended to furnish the product s pharmacological activity or 
direct effects.63 The active ingredient patent is the most important patent 
for the inventor, because it usually aligns with the regulatory requirements 
governing approval of copies. That is, a competitor may file an 
abbreviated  application for a generic copy of a non-biological drug, 
provided the application shows the generic drug s active ingredient is the 
same.64 An abbreviated application omits the safety and effectiveness data 
                                                     
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. Various other conditions must be satisfied for a patent to issue. See, e.g., 
id. § 112 (written description requirement). 
60. See id. § 132. 
61. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., R-10.2019, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
201.07 201.09 (2020). Continuation and continuation-in-part applications can respond to new 
information that became available after the original filing. See id. For instance, a continuation 
application may make new claims, based on the disclosure in the original application. A continuation-
in-part application may add subject matter and make new claims, which might be desirable if the 
inventor changed the invention after filing the original application.  
62. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., R-10.2019, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
201.06 (2020). Divisional applications are limited to the subject matter disclosed in the parent 
application. See id. 
63. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2019). 
64. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (authorizing submission of an abbreviated new drug application 
(ANDA)). 
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that the inventor was required to include, and it is correspondingly faster 
to prepare and much cheaper perhaps a few million dollars, compared 
with the one or two billion spent by the inventor.65 But the generic 
pathway is available only if the active ingredient is the same, so the active 
ingredient patent generally is key to ensuring a period without generic 
competition.66 So too with biosimilar copies of biologics.67 The applicant 
must show that its product is highl  similar  to the inventor s product,68 
which requires a comparative showing at the active ingredient level and 
usually implicates the active ingredient patent.69 
Conventional wisdom holds that firms developing drug products 
should file their active ingredient patents before they begin testing any 
formulation of the active ingredient in humans.70 Various doctrines of 
patent law provide a strong incentive to file this application as early as 
possible.71 Patent law also permits early filing; the law requires proof of 
utilit  which, for a drug, can ordinaril  be shown with evidence from 
laboratory and animal testing.72 Empirical research suggests that the 
                                                     
65. See FED. TRADE COMM N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG 
COMPETITION iii (2019) (noting that cost of developing a generic drug is $1 5 million). 
66. The drug statute also permits semi-abbreviated applications for drugs that have different active 
ingredients from their reference  products. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2). However, these are not 
generic copies, and they are beyond the scope of this Article. 
67. Although the drug statute requires a generic drug to have the same  active ingredient as the 
innovative product on which it is based, the biologics statute permits a biosimilar biologic to be simply 
highl  similar  with minor differences in clinicall  inactive components.  Compare 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2) (drugs), with 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (biologics). This Article refers to both generic drugs and 
biosimilar biologics as copies  for convenience. 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i), (k). 
69. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2011-D-0605, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SCIENTIFIC 
CONSIDERATIONS IN DEMONSTRATING BIOSIMILARITY TO A REFERENCE PRODUCT 9 10 (2015). 
70. See, e.g., Roin, supra note 6, at 539 (stating that [p]harmaceutical patents are t picall  filed 
when drugs are in earl  preclinical research ); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in 
Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 348 (2007) (noting that applications 
for composition of matter  patents are filed before clinical testing of a molecule begins). 
71. For example, a patent will generally be denied if the invention was in public use for more than 
a year before the patent application was filed. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
72. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., R-10.2019, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
2107.03 (2020) (requiring evidence that reasonabl  supports  pharmacological or therapeutic utilit  
and noting that data from in vitro or animal testing is generall  sufficient ); see also Nelson v. 
Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding utility based on data showing pharmacodynamic 
activity in animals, specifically, stimulating smooth muscle tissue in gerbils and modulating blood 
pressure in rats); Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding utility on basis of in 
vitro demonstration of the claimed biological activity preventing aggregation of platelets); In re 
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ( Our court s predecessor has determined that proof of 
an alleged pharmaceutical property for a compound by statistically significant tests with standard 
experimental animals is sufficient to establish utility . . . the [Krimmel] [C]ourt[ s] . . . firm 
conviction [was] that one who has taught the public that a compound exhibits some desirable 
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earliest patent filing for new drugs occurs well before the first 
human trials.73 
In addition to an active ingredient patent, a drug s developer might hold 
a patent claiming the formulation or composition of the finished product, 
meaning the particular combination of active and inactive ingredients.74 It 
might hold a patent claiming a particular dosage form and dosage of the 
active ingredient or formulation.75 Other possibilities include a patent 
claiming a method of using or administering the product, a patent claiming 
the manufacturing process, and a patent claiming a metabolite of the 
active ingredient.76 These patents may relate back to and reference the 
earlier application, and some could even be continuation or continuation-
in-part patents. But it is also possible for a drug s developer to hold a new 
patent claiming another invention relating to the drug, which it sought 
during the premarket research program and which does not relate back to 
an earlier application. 
C. Patent Term Distortion 
In 1962, Congress amended the FDCA to require that firms obtain 
preapproval of their new drugs and to require that their applications 
include proof of effectiveness (in addition to safety, which the statute had 
already required).77 The FDA s expectations about the content and scope 
of marketing applications grew more rigorous over the decades that 
followed.78 The period from the first test in humans to the first commercial 
sale expanded, with predictable result: the amount of patent life 
                                                     
pharmaceutical property in a standard experimental animal has made a significant and useful 
contribution to the art, even though it may eventually appear that the compound is without value in 
the treatment in humans.  (quoting In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961))). 
73. See Lietzan, supra note 38, at 86 (examining 570 new drug applications approved between 
August 1984 and August 2016 and finding an average gap of 5.61 years between (1) the date of filing 
of the earliest-filed patent covering the drug or a method of using the drug and (2) the date FDA 
permitted clinical trials to begin); Michael K. Dunn, Timing of Patent Filing and Market Exclusivity, 
10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 487, 488 (2011) (examining the relationship between initial 
filing date of the earliest patent application and final effective patent life, which the author refers to 
as market exclusivity,  and illustrating that the initial patent filing date is consistently before the start 
of clinical trials). 
74. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2019). An inactive ingredient is any component other than the active 
ingredient, such as an excipient, preservative, solvent, buffer, or coating. See id. § 314.3. 
75. See id. § 314.53(b). 
76. See id. See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 38 46 (2005) (listing 
various types of drug patent claims). 
77. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 103, 76 Stat. 780, 783 (1962). 
78. See Lietzan, supra note 38, at 52 54. 
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remaining, by the time companies launched their drugs, grew shorter.79 
These remaining ears are the effective  life of the patent the years 
during which the inventor may lawfully exploit the invention in the 
market, without others also selling the invention. 
As noted, a drug inventor usually files the first patent application before 
starting clinical trials, which would generally lead to patent issuance at 
the beginning of (or during) clinical trials.80 During these decades, and 
indeed until the mid-1990s, a patent lasted for seventeen years from 
issuance.81 As clinical programs grew longer, the effective life of this 
patent therefore grew shorter, effectively distorting the patent. If the 
patent applicant filed a continuation or continuation-in-part application, 
the patent might issue later in time and thus expire later, but so long as the 
patent issued during the premarket program, some portion of the term 
would be sacrificed.82 Economic studies in the 1970s and early 1980s 
showed that drug effective patent life had plummeted since the 1962 
amendments.83 Concern about the diminishing effective patent life, 
combined with studies finding a decline in the rate of new drug 
introductions over the same years, led to proposals that lost patent life be 
restored to inventors after drug approval.84 
D. Patent Term Restoration 
In 1984, these proposals bore fruit with the enactment of section 156 
of the Patent Act, part of a broader piece of legislation that also created a 
statutory pathway for approval of generic drug applications.85 The basic 
                                                     
79. See Erika Lietzan, The History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 49 
SETON HALL L. REV. 53, 68 (2018).  
80. See sources cited supra note 73; see also F. M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological 
Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 100 (1993) (noting that patents on 
new drug chemical entities were t picall  obtained at about the time when clinical testing began  
when section 156 was enacted). 
81. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982); see discussion infra Part II. 
82. See Lietzan, supra note 79, at 65. 
83. See, e.g., DAVID SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 173 
(1976) (finding that average effective patent life for new drugs had dropped to 13.9 years by the late 
1960s and that it dropped to 12.4 years by the early 1970s); Martin M. Eisman & William M. Wardell, 
The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New Drugs, 24 RSCH. MGMT. 18, 20 (1981) (finding that 
average effective patent life dropped to 9.5 years by 1979); Peter Barton Hutt, The Importance of 
Patent Term Restoration to Pharmaceutical Innovation, 1 HEALTH AFFS. 6, 16 17 (1982) (discussing 
other studies); Leonard G. Schifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962 
Drug Regulations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 91, 102 09 (1982) (discussing other studies). See 
generally Lietzan, supra note 79, at 66 68. 
84. See Lietzan, supra note 79, at 70 71, 77. 
85. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
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approach of section 156 has not changed since 1984. It permits extension 
of a patent claiming a drug, a method of using the drug, or a method of 
manufacturing the drug, if the drug was subject to a regulator  review 
period  before commercial marketing or use.86 Put more simply, 
restoration is available for a patent claiming a drug product that went 
through premarket approval. 
The PTO will restore a patent subject to three conditions. First, the PTO 
must deny patent term restoration if the FDA has already approved the 
active ingredient (or its salt or ester) pursuant to another application filed 
under the same FDA approval provision.87 If the patent proposed for 
restoration claims a method of manufacturing a product using 
recombinant DNA technology, however, the regulatory review period 
must represent the first commercial marketing of a product manufactured 
using the process.88 Second, the PTO may extend only one patent for each 
regulatory review period.89 In practice this means one patent for each 
approved marketing application. This does not, however, mean one patent 
for each new active ingredient. The FDA sometimes requires companies 
to submit separate marketing applications at the same time for a single 
new active ingredient.90 If the FDA approves these marketing applications 
                                                     
Stat. 1585 (1984). 
86. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a). For a drug, the regulator  review period  is the period combining (1) the 
clinical testing period, which begins when FDA authorizes clinical trials by permitting an 
investigational new drug application (IND) to go into effect and which ends when the company 
submits its new drug application (NDA) or biologics license application (BLA), and (2) the approval 
period, which begins when the company submits its NDA or BLA to FDA and ends when FDA 
approves that application. See id. § 156(g). 
87. The permission for commercial marketing after the regulatory review period must be the first 
permitted commercial marketing of the product  under the provision of law under which the 
regulatory review period occurred. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(5)(A). The term product  means the 
active ingredient . . . including an  salt or ester of the active ingredient.  Id. § 156(f)(1), (2). The 
statute does not define active ingredient,  however, and the PTO s approach to the term has changed. 
In 2010 the Federal Circuit rejected the PTO s approach of considering whether FDA had previousl  
approved any drug containing the same underlying active moiety, See Photocure ASA v. Kappos, 603 
F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and the PTO has since focused on whether FDA has approved a 
drug with the same active ingredient. At FDA, the active moiet  is the molecule responsible for the 
physiological or pharmacological action of the drug, while the active ingredient is the substance 
introduced to the body. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2019); Abbott Labs v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 
(D.C. Cir. 1990). 
88. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(5)(B). 
89. Id. § 156(c)(4). 
90. For example, FDA requires separate marketing applications for different dosage forms and for 
different routes of administration. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2001-D-0134, GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY, SUBMITTING SEPARATE MARKETING APPLICATIONS AND CLINICAL DATA FOR 
PURPOSES OF ASSESSING USER FEES 3 (2004). Also, FDA sometimes splits marketing applications 
by indication, typically so that different review divisions can review the indications.  
 
Acri & Lietzan 08 Lietzan and Acri-10-27(Do Not Delete) 10/27/2020  4:49 PM 
2020] DISTORTED DRUG PATENTS 1335 
 
on the same day, the PTO will extend a patent for each application. Third, 
the PTO may extend a patent only if it has not already extended the patent 
under section 156 (for instance in connection with a different drug).91 
Beyond these three substantive conditions, the PTO imposes several 
procedural requirements on applicants.92 
The PTO does not restore all days lost to premarket research and 
development. Patent life lost to animal and laboratory testing for FDA 
purposes is not recoverable, even if these studies involve far more than 
would be needed to secure a patent. Instead, the PTO restores the days lost 
to clinical testing and FDA review of the marketing application, subject 
to five limitations which it applies in the order that follows. First, the PTO 
does not restore any portion of the regulatory review period before patent 
issuance.93 Second, the PTO does not restore any portion of the regulatory 
review period during which the applicant did not act with due diligence.94 
Third, it restores only half of the testing period after patent issuance.95 The 
PTO restores every day of the approval period. Fourth, it restores no more 
than five years.96 There is a different cap for a patent issued before 
enactment (September 24, 1984) if the product was already in clinical 
trials but not approved on that date.97 For these pipeline  drugs, the 
PTO restores no more than two years.98 Finally, the effective patent life 
                                                     
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(2), (c)(4). Interim extensions, discussed in the text, do not count.  
92. For instance, the patent owner must submit its request within sixty days of FDA approval. Id. 
§ 156(d). As a result of a court ruling in 2010 and a legislative change in 2011, the PTO counts every 
calendar day beginning on the first business day after FDA approval. See Meds. Co. v. Kappos, 731 
F. Supp. 2d 470 (E.D. Va. 2010) (requiring PTO to use a business day counting approach, meaning 
that the sixty days would begin on the first business day after FDA approval if that approved did not 
occur on a business day); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(adopting a business counting approach); 35 U.S.C. § 156(d). A statutory change in 2015 changed the 
deadline for controlled substances subject to scheduling decisions: the deadline is sixty days after 
FDA approval or issuance of an interim final rule scheduling the drug, whichever is later. Improving 
Regulatory Transparency for New Medical Therapies Act, Pub. L. No. 114-89, 129 Stat. 698 (2015); 
35 U.S.C. § 156(i). 
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c). 
94. See id. § 156(c)(1). As of April 1, 2018, FDA had never adjusted its calculation of the regulatory 
review period after finding the patentee failed to act with due diligence. One applicant for patent term 
restoration admitted a lack of due diligence for 935 days, during which the IND (investigational new 
drug application) was inactive. The PTO subtracted these days from the testing phase. See Corrected 
Notice of Final Determination, In re Patent Term Extension Application for U.S. Patent 
No. 5,681,814, FDA Docket No. 2006E-0025 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Apr. 18, 2007) (corrected 
notice of final determination).  
95. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(2). 
96. Id. § 156(g)(6).  
97. Id.  
98. Id. § 156(g)(6)(C).  
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after patent term restoration may not exceed fourteen years.99 Put another 
way, the expiry date of the restored patent must be no later than the 
fourteen- ear anniversar  of the FDA s approval of the 
marketing application. 
In 1993, Congress amended the statute to permit two types of interim 
grants of patent term restoration, which tide a patentee over until FDA 
approval of the marketing application and the PTO s decision on the 
patent term restoration request.100 First, subsection (d)(5) authorizes one-
year interim extensions if the FDA approval process would extend past 
patent expiry.101 The PTO will not issue a (d)(5) extension, however, 
unless the FDA has already accepted the marketing application.102 A 
(d)(5) interim extension ends sixty days after marketing approval, which 
coincides with the deadline to apply for ordinary (non-interim) patent term 
restoration.103 Second, subsection (e)(2) authorizes one-year interim 
extensions after FDA approval, while the PTO considers the request for 
restoration.104 The PTO will grant an (e)(2) extension without consulting 
the FDA to determine whether the drug satisfies the eligibility 
standards.105 With one exception, the total patent term extension including 
                                                     
99. Id. § 156(c)(3). 
100. Patent and Trademark Office Authorization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103 179, 107 Stat. 2040 
(1993). This law took effect on December 3, 1993. Although subsection (e)(2) took effect in 
December 1993, the PTO s regulations already provided for one-year interim extensions when a 
complete PTR application had been submitted but the PTO s decision had not been issued. See Rules 
for Patent Extension, 52 Fed. Reg. 9386, 9391 (Mar. 24, 1987) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
(explaining 7 C.F.R. § 1.760 (1987)). 
101. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(5). 
102. See Final Decision Regarding Interim Patent Extension Application Under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156(d)(5), In re Patent Term Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. RE41209, FDA Docket 
No. 2016-E (Pat. & Trademark Off. Feb. 4, 2016). The PTO reasons that the statute requires this, by 
stating that the applicant for patent term restoration must reasonably expect that the approval process 
that began  for the product will extend past patent expiry. See id.  
103. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(5)(E). 
104. Id. § 156(e)(2). 
105. In one case, after granting two interim extensions, the PTO denied restoration on eligibility 
grounds and rescinded the second interim extension. Initially, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) received two 
(e)(2) interim extensions for Vusion (miconazole nitrate, white petrolatum, and zinc oxide). The 
company had put forward a plausible argument that it was entitled to patent term restoration: zinc 
oxide had reached the market under an earlier version of section 505 of the FDCA that did not require 
premarket approval and did not involve proving effectiveness. See Response to Order to Show Cause 
at 2, In re Patent of Charles E. Clum, U.S. Patent No. 4,911,932 (filed Feb. 11, 1985) (issued Mar. 
27, 1990). But more than 20 years earlier, the PTO had rejected identical reasoning in a matter 
involving a different drug concluding that marketing ammonium lactate under an NDA submitted 
under this earlier version of section 505 constituted relevant commercial marketing under section 156. 
And in the earlier matter, a federal court had rejected the patent owner s court challenge, deferring to 
the PTO. Westwood Pharms., Inc. v. Quigg, No. 88 2198, 1989 WL 205631, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
In the end, despite initially granting J&J two interim extensions, the PTO concluded that the earlier 
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interim extensions cannot exceed the extension for which the patentee 
would be eligible under section 156.106 The exception is this: a pipeline 
drug is entitled to two years of effective patent life from the date of 
marketing approval regardless of any interims received.107 
E. Summation 
In short, then, federal law requires the sellers of new drugs to test their 
drugs and seek approval before launching. This process is not only 
expensive and risky but time consuming, and the seller has surprisingly 
little control over the length of time it takes. Society encourages the 
investment in question by promising patents for the associated inventions 
and, more precisely, by promising each invention a period of patent-based 
exclusivity in the market. New drugs may be associated with a variety of 
inventions, including most importantly a new and useful active 
ingredient. But drug inventors usually file their first patent applications 
before they start testing their drugs in humans, which means that much of 
the patent term elapses before the government permits them to launch. 
Congress responded to this by enacting patent term restoration in 1984, 
but the PTO restores only half of the patent life lost to clinical testing, and 
it cannot restore more than five years, no matter how long testing takes. 
II. HYPOTHESES 
The discussion in Part I provided the basis for several hypotheses, as 
follows. Without patent term restoration, longer premarket research and 
development programs should distort drug patents leading to shorter 
effective patent life. And certain therapeutic categories should be 
associated with shorter effective patent life. Further, because the Patent 
Act does not restore every day of patent life lost to premarket research and 
development, this distortion should still be evident after the PTO extends 
the patent term. Restoring only 50% of the days spent in clinical trials 
should preserve the distortion, because the patent owner will continue to 
lose days of patent life in proportion to the length of its clinical program. 
The five-year cap should have a more dramatic impact: once a clinical 
program reaches a certain length, more testing should simply translate to 
                                                     
precedent controlled. Denial of Patent Term Extension Application at 1 2, In re Patent Term 
Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. 4,911,932, FDA Docket No. 2007E-0035 (Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Mar. 19, 2009). Thus, it concluded that Vusion did not represent the first permitted 
commercial marketing of miconazole nitrate or zinc oxide and that the patent did not claim white 
petrolatum, vacated the second interim extension, and denied patent term restoration. Id. at 2.  
106. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.760, 1.790(a) (2019). 
107. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(5)(E)(ii).  
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lost patent life just as was the case before Congress enacted section 156. 
Hitting the five- ear cap should mean a drug s final effective patent life 
will be shorter and less likely to reach fourteen years. 
Drugs with longer clinical programs, and drugs with longer overall 
premarket research and development programs, should be associated with 
application of the five-year cap. These drugs should be less likely to reach 
the fourteen-year maximum effective patent life, and they should be 
associated with a shorter final effective patent life. And some therapeutic 
categories those associated with longer average clinical programs
should be associated with application of the five-year cap. These drugs 
should be less likely to reach the fourteen-year limit, and they should be 
associated with a shorter final effective patent life. 
The 1994 change in the patent law leads to another hypothesis, but 
explaining the hypothesis requires a more detailed explanation of how the 
change was implemented. As already noted, in 1984 a patent lasted for 
seventeen years from issuance.108 In the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act 
(URAA), Congress revised section 154 of the Patent Act, which governs 
the patent term.109 For patents issued on applications filed on or after June 
8, 1995, the term is twenty years from the patent application or, if the 
application refers to an earlier-filed application, twenty years from the 
date of that application.110 Put another way, a child application expires 
twenty years after its parent application was filed. Complicating things 
further, patents in force on June 8, 1995, or that issued on applications 
filed before that date, received the benefit of this change in the law.111 In 
other words, these transitional  patents lasted either twent  ears from 
application or seventeen years from issuance, whichever ended later.112 
The new calculation was more favorable if the PTO had issued the patent 
in fewer than thirty-six months and there were no earlier-filed 
applications. In these cases, the new calculation led to a revision of the 
expiration date in what came to be known as the URAA extension.  
The relationship between the URAA extension and patent term 
restoration was briefly muddled. On June 7, 1995, the PTO announced 
that patentees would enjoy either the URAA extension or patent term 
                                                     
108. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). 
109. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103 465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4983 
(1994). This statute implemented the Marrakesh Agreement of 1984, itself part of the negotiations 
that transformed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Id. § 2, 108 Stat. at 4813 14. 
110. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).  
111. Id. § 154(c)(1). 
112. Id. 
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restoration whichever was longer but not both.113 On October 16 of 
the same year, however, the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that a 
patentee was entitled to both.114 And then on April 4, 1996, the Federal 
Circuit took a different position.115 The owners of patents in force on June 
8, 1995, were entitled to add patent term restoration to a twenty-year 
patent term, even if the PTO had already calculated restoration and issued 
a certificate.116 If, however, the patent was in force on June 8, 1995, only 
because of patent term restoration i.e., it was then enjoying its restored 
days the URAA extension was unavailable.117 The PTO had been 
restoring patents all the while, and eventually restorations had to be 
recalculated to conform to the Federal Circuit ruling. 
Drugs approved in the thirty-five years since enactment of section 156 
have been protected by patents subject to three different patent term 
regimes: the pre-URAA regime in which patents lasted for seventeen 
years from issuance, the post-URAA regime in which patents lasted for 
twenty years from application or parent application, and the transition 
regime.118 And most drugs were protected by more than one patent.119 For 
any particular drug, these patents may have varied in scope (for example, 
active ingredient versus formulation) as well as type (child versus parent) 
and term (seventeen years from issuance versus twenty years from 
application). And the drug company could select any one of these patents 
for restoration. Because the PTO will restore only a portion of the clinical 
                                                     
113. Patent Term Extensions Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and Their Effects on 
Marketing Applications for Human and Animal Drug Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 30309 (June 8, 1995). 
114. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 903 F. Supp. 964, 964 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff d in part and rev d in 
part, 80 F.3d 1543, 1544 (4th Cir. 1996). 
115. Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1544.  
116. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1). 
117. Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1550.  
118. This is an oversimplification. In 1994 and again in 1999, Congress also enacted patent term 
adjustment to provide relief for the shortening of effective patent life stemming from delays at the 
PTO. First, as part of the URAA, Congress provided for adjustment of the patent term to compensate 
for delay because of an interference proceeding, secrecy order, or appellate review of an adverse 
decision on patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2000). This adjustment applied to patent applications 
filed on or after June 8, 1995, and before May 29, 2000. 21 C.F.R. § 1.701(e) (2019). Second, in 1999, 
Congress provided for automatic adjustment of the patent term to compensate for more routine delays 
at the PTO. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4402, 113 Stat. 
1501A-552, at 1501A-557 to 1501A-560 (1999). Section 154(b) now states various deadlines for 
stages in the patent prosecution such as three years for completion of the entire process (subject to 
various exceptions) and generally requires a day of adjustment for each day of delay beyond the 
stated deadlines. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). This scheme applies to patent applications filed after May 29, 
2000. § 4405(a), 113 Stat. at 1501A-560. 
119. Patents issued after approval would not be among them (unless they were issued immediately 
after approval). A company must request patent term restoration within sixty days of receiving FDA 
approval. 35 U.S.C. § 156(d); see discussion supra note 92. 
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trial period after patent issuance, selecting a child patent subject to a 
seventeen-year term should be associated with longer final effective 
patent life but restoring a child patent subject to a twenty-year term should 
be associated with shorter final effective patent life, as follows. 
Restoring a child patent should be associated with longer final effective 
patent life if that patent is subject to the seventeen-year patent term. Under 
this regime, if a company filed its application later, the resulting patent 
would generally issue later and therefore have a later expiry date. Because 
the PTO will restore only the portion of the clinical trial period after patent 
issuance, less of the clinical period would be eligible for restoration. But 
the smaller number of restoration days would be added to a later expiry 
date. Because the PTO restores only 50% of the time spent in trials, a 
restored later-issuing child seventeen-year patent would expire later than 
a restored earlier-issuing parent seventeen-year patent. 
Conversely, restoring a child patent should be associated with a shorter 
final effective patent life if that patent is subject to the twenty-year patent 
term. Under this regime, if a company files its application later, the 
resulting patent will generally issue later but it will not have a later 
expiry date. The expiry date is now keyed to the date of the parent 
application. As before, the PTO will restore only the portion of the clinical 
period after patent issuance, so less of the clinical period is eligible for 
restoration. But in this case, the PTO will not be adding this smaller 
number to a later expiry date. This leads to the final hypothesis: restoring 
a child patent should be associated with longer effective patent life if the 
seventeen-year patent term applies, but not if the twenty-year 
term applies. 
Part III explores these questions examining all 642 drug (including 
biologic) patent term restoration grants from enactment of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments on September 24, 1984, through April 1, 2018. 
III. FINDINGS 
This Part describes our findings. It first describes how our dataset was 
assembled and what the dataset contains. Next, it offers descriptive 
statistics using the dataset to describe average clinical program length, 
for example, as well as average effective patent life before patent term 
restoration, and the impact of patent term restoration. Finally, it explores 
whether longer premarket research programs lead to shorter effective 
patent life, by using a series of regressions to explore the determinants of 
effective patent life. 
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A. Dataset and Methodology 
The dataset used in this Article was generated as follows. 
1. Generating the Dataset of 642 Drugs 
First, the PTO provided a spreadsheet of all patent term restoration 
applications received between September 28, 1984, and April 1, 2017.120 
The PTO also maintains a table of patent term restoration grants on its 
website.121 Neither list is complete, so the lists were combined, and 
duplicates removed.122 Although some PTR applications could have been 
omitted from both sources, the Federal Register was used to confirm that 
the PTO restored no other drug or biologic patent in the interval studied. 
The PTO cannot restore a patent until the FDA has published the 
regulatory review period in the Federal Register. Second, drugs and 
biologics were extracted for analysis. Section 156 authorizes patent term 
restoration for other regulated products: food additives, color additives, 
animal drugs, and veterinary biologics. These were excluded.123 
Third, we extracted the drugs and biologics for which the PTO granted 
patent term restoration before April 1, 2018.124 In a handful of instances, 
                                                     
120. Email from Mary Till, Legal Advisor, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., to Erika Lietzan, Assoc. 
Professor, Univ. of Mo. Sch. of L., and Kristina M.L. Acri née Lybecker, Assoc. Professor & Dept. 
Chair, Dept. of Econ. & Bus., Colo. Coll. (Apr. 2017) (on file with authors) (containing a Patent Term 
Restoration Application Spreadsheet).  
121. Patent Terms Extended Under 35 U.S.C. § 156, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/patent-term-extension/patent-terms-extended-
under-35-usc-156 [https://perma.cc/3DWP-E4TS]. 
122. For instance, the spreadsheet omitted but the table included Atrovent (ipratropium 
bromide). The table omitted but the spreadsheet included more than fifty new drugs with restored 
patents, including Savella (milnacipran hydrochloride), Potiga (ezogabine), and Myfortic 
(mycophenolic acid).  
123. The PTO s spreadsheet classified the products, but some products were misclassified. For 
instance, the PTO lists Lac-Hydrin (ammonium lactate) and Nix (permethrin) as medical devices, 
although FDA approved them under new drug applications. The PTO lists Luveris (lutropin alfa), 
Lantus (insulin glargine recombinant), Novolog (insulin aspart recombinant), Increlex (mecasermin 
recombinant), Iplex (mecasermin rinfabate recombinant), and Omontys (peginesatide acetate) as 
biologics, but FDA approved them under new drug applications. We categorized the products in the 
spreadsheet manually based on the regulatory review provisions new drug approval, biologics 
license approval, medical device approval or clearance, new animal drug approval, or food additive 
petition that would have been applied by FDA.  
124. In most cases, we examined the PTO s notice of final determination and the patent extension 
certificate, found in the Image File Wrapper available through the PTO s Public Patent Application 
Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. PAIR was missing the relevant documents for some patents. In 
these cases, we relied on other sources of information. For instance, the PTO list of patent terms 
extended includes links to some certificates. Some notices of final determination are available through 
Westlaw, and others can be found through hyperlinks in a PTO list of notices mailed after November 
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the FDA approved more than one marketing application for the same 
active ingredient on the same day, which allowed the PTO to extend more 
than one patent.125 In these situations, the lower-numbered (and thus 
earlier-filed) marketing application was extracted for analysis; the higher-
numbered application was omitted. If a patent owner enjoyed interim 
extensions that ultimately equaled the number of days sought, we treated 
the restoration as granted even if the PTO never ruled on the restoration 
request.126 If the company ultimately received zero days of extension
because the effective patent life already exceeded fourteen years we 
treated the restoration as denied.127 
Finally, we excluded drugs for which no investigational new drug 
application (IND) ever took effect. Federal law requires an IND for 
clinical trials if the drug in question will be shipped in interstate 
commerce.128 The lack of an IND means the company performed its 
clinical trials overseas. These drugs were omitted from the dataset because 
the clinical trial period for purposes of patent term restoration begins on 
the IND effective date and was, therefore, zero days for these products
not a factually correct representation of the number of days spent in 
clinical testing. 
                                                     
1, 1996, and January 1, 2005. Patent Term Extension (Restoration) under 35 U.S.C. § 156 
Decisions Commissioner for Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/foia_rr/resources/patents/pte.jsp [https://perma.cc/5NMT-UHFJ]. 
125. See supra section I.D. Drug companies do not always seize the opportunity to restore more 
than one patent. For instance, twice Fujisawa asked for restoration of only one patent, even though 
the FDA had approved two applications for the same active ingredient on the same day. The drugs in 
question were Prograf (tacrolimus) and Mycamine (micafungin sodium). The PTO had even told the 
company that two patents are eligible for extension based on the regulatory review periods for 
Mycamine (micafungun sodium) in NDA 21 506 and 21 754.  Notice of Final Determination and 
Requirement for Election, In re Patent Term Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. 5,376,634, 
FDA Docket No. 2005E-0252 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Dec. 10, 2007). But Fujisawa declined to take 
this path. See Response to Requirement for Election Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.785, In re Patent Term 
Extension Application for U.S. Patent No. 5,376,634 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Jan. 9, 2008) 
( Applicants respectfully elect the Application for Patent Term Extension for U.S. Patent 
No. 6,107,458 based on NDA 21-506. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully withdraw the Application 
for Patent Term Extension of U.S. Patent No. 6,265,536 based on NDA 21-754. ). 
126. In nine instances, the patentee received all patent term restoration it had sought, through 
sequential interim extensions. We dropped four because the FDA never calculated the regulatory 
review period (so we could not confirm the dates asserted by the applicant in its PTR application). 
We treated the remaining five as grants of PTR. 
127. This includes instances in which the PTO initially granted an extension, but the URAA 
extension applied later and took the unrestored patent life past the fourteen-year limit, so no 
restoration was ultimately applied. This was true in the case of Zofran (ondansetron) and Suprane 
(desflurane), for instance. 
128. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (i). 
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2. Gathering Additional Data for Analysis 
The final dataset contains 642 drugs (also called observations  in the 
statistical portion of this Article), for which we gathered other information 
as follows. First, we collected regulatory information about each drug: 
(1) the date on which the IND took effect, allowing the company to start 
clinical trials, (2) the date on which the company submitted its marketing 
application, (3) the date on which the FDA approved the application, 
(4) the length of the clinical testing period, and (5) the length of the FDA 
review period.129 We also assigned each drug a therapeutic category.130 
Second, we collected information about each restored patent: (1) the 
date on which the inventor filed the patent application that led to issuance 
of the patent, (2) the date that would control calculation of a twenty-year 
patent term under current law,131 and (3) the date on which the patent 
issued, or the date on which the original patent issued in the case of a 
reissued patent.132 The collected patent information also included (1) the 
type of term the patent enjoyed (seventeen-year, twenty-year, or 
transitional and if so which),133 (2) whether the patent was a child 
patent, (3) the number of days of patent term adjustment, if any,134 (4) the 
                                                     
129. The FDA publishes this information in the Federal Register when it calculates the regulatory 
review period.  
130. The methodology was crude. Some drugs in the dataset were withdrawn from the market years 
ago, and some were never launched in the U.S. As a result, no readily available dataset provides a 
therapeutic category for every drug in the dataset. An orthogonal approach was adopted. For each 
drug, five factors were considered: the established pharmacological class assigned by the FDA; the 
initial use for which the drug was approved; the category and class assigned in the U.S. 
Pharmacopoeia (USP) Medicare Model Guidelines for CMS Version 7.0; the anatomical therapeutic 
classification (ATC) assigned by the World Health Organization (WHO); and the category assigned 
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in its National Library of Medicine Drug Portal. Based on 
this information, each drug was placed in a category corresponding roughly to one of the categories 
in the USP guidelines. 
131. If the patent resulted from an original patent application with no reference to an earlier-filed 
U.S. application, the relevant date was the filing date of the application or, if applicable, the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) filing date. If the patent resulted from an application that was a 
continuation, continuation-in-part, or division of an earlier-filed application, the new application 
necessarily cited the earlier application (and any earlier applications, in turn). In these cases, the 
relevant date was the earliest filing date of any related U.S. application referenced in the application. 
If the restored patent was a reissue of an earlier patent, our analysis identified the relevant date for the 
originally issued patent.  
132. A patent may be reissued to correct certain types of error; in this case the patent number 
changes (and now begins with RE ) but the term remains the same. 35 U.S.C. § 251; see also Patent 
Number, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-
process/applying-online/patent-number# [https://perma.cc/AW34-MWK9]. 
133. See supra Part II. 
134. See sources cited supra note 118. Patent term adjustment was generally taken from documents 
available on PAIR. 
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original patent expiry date (after patent term adjustment) without patent 
term restoration,135 (5) how the PTO calculated patent term restoration,136 
(6) whether the PTO applied the five-year (or two-year) cap and fourteen-
year limit,137 (7) the number of days restored,138 and (8) the final patent 
expiry date after restoration.139 These entries reflect case-by-case 
judgment calls, based on the law and based on review and consideration 
of several sources for each patent. The goal in each case was to ensure 
that the patent term type, original expiration date, restoration award, and 
revised expiration date were internally consistent (each with the others), 
legally correct (considering changes in the law that applied during the 
patent life), and corroborated by at least one source. 
                                                     
135. Various sources report this information: the spreadsheet provided by the PTO; the table of 
terms restored on the PTO s website; patent term restoration applications themselves; the PTO s 
notices of final determination; and for composition of matter and method of use patents covering new 
drugs, editions of the ORANGE BOOK published before patent expiry. In this annual publication, the 
FDA publishes the numbers and expiration date of every unexpired patent that claims an approved 
drug or method of using that drug. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS 
WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at ADA1 263 (39th ed. 2019) (commonly known 
as the Orange Book ).  
These sources sometimes contained errors, and in some cases the information reported was 
superseded by later events. For example, the spreadsheet from the PTO contained typographical 
mistakes. In addition, some dates were later changed by patent term adjustment, see supra note 118, 
or the URAA extension, see supra Part II. That is, the PTO might have issued a final decision on 
patent term restoration before June 1995, relying on a seventeen-year term for the patent, and the term 
could have later shifted to a twenty-year term. In this case the PTO s notice of final determination 
would have calculated the restoration due and offered a revised expiration date based on adding those 
days to the original expiration date. When the patent later converted to a twenty-year term, some of 
this information became incorrect, but the PTO did not issue new documents. The dataset reflects the 
ultimate final expiry date after all adjustments were made.  
It does not, however, capture terminal disclaimers filed later in the life of the patent. A terminal 
disclaimer causes the patent to expire on the same date as an earlier patent and is typically filed to 
avoid invalidation of the patent on obviousness  grounds. 
136. This appears in the notice of final determination, and most notices are available on PAIR or 
(in a few cases) on Westlaw. Some contain mathematical or calendar errors, but in these cases the 
patent extension certificate is typically still correct.  
137. This appears in the notice of final determination. We corroborated it with the patent term 
extension certificate or the list of patent terms extended on the PTO s website, or the ORANGE BOOK 
if neither of these sources provided the information needed. We confirmed application of the fourteen-
year limit by comparing all final expiration dates with all FDA approval dates, and we confirmed 
application of the two-year and five-year caps by comparing final expiration dates with original 
expiration dates. 
138. We took this from the notice of final determination, if it was available on PAIR, the extension 
certificate, or the list of patent terms extended on the PTO s website. 
139. We took this from the notice of final determination and corroborated it with at least one other 
source typically the list on the PTO s website, but in some cases the ORANGE BOOK. As explained 
in supra note 135, the dates reported in these documents were sometimes superseded by later events. 
In these cases the dataset reflects the corrected information, which was corroborated with at least one 
additional source whenever possible.  
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Third, we gathered information about the lifecycle of the 554 non-
biological drugs but not the eighty-eight biologics in the dataset.140 
This included the number and filing date of every patent claiming the drug 
or an approved method of using the drug listed in the ORANGE BOOK 
before April 1, 2018.141 This information is incomplete for antibiotics 
approved before 1997 because this publication omits patents on these 
drugs that expired before October 8, 2008.142 The dataset also includes the 
date on which the company launched the non-biological drug in the 
market and the launch date of the first generic drug containing the same 
active ingredient.143 
B. The Effect of Patent Term Restoration 
The resulting dataset of drugs and biologics approved over more than 
                                                     
140. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments included statutory authority to approve generic drugs, and 
FDA approved generic drugs throughout the period covered by our dataset. Congress did not enact 
comparable authority for biologics until 2010. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
141. The patent numbers and expiration dates appear in the ORANGE BOOK. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., supra note 135, at ADA 1 ADA 263. The filing date for purposes of the dataset was the 
earliest filing date appearing on the face of the patent, considering patent filings in other countries 
and any provisional application filed in the United States.  
142. Before November 1, 1997, antibiotic drugs reached the market under section 507 of the FDCA 
rather than section 505 of the FDCA. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 105-115, 
§ 125(b)(1), 111 Stat. 2325 (1997)). The Hatch-Waxman scheme did not apply to them, so they were 
not subject to patent listing requirements. The pre-1997 ( old ) antibiotics were not subject to listing 
requirements until October 7, 2008. Q1 Program Supplemental Funding Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110-
379, § 4(b), 122 Stat. 4075 (2008) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355); Draft Guidance for Industry 
on the Submission of Patent Information for Certain Old Antibiotics, 73 Fed. Reg. 73,659 (Dec. 3, 
2008). Beginning on October 8, 2008, the holders of approved applications for old antibiotics listed 
patents, including patents that had already been issued, but they did not list expired patents. Thus, if 
a patent for an old antibiotic expired before that date, it would have never appeared in the ORANGE 
BOOK. 
143. IQVIA provided the launch dates. We do not have complete launch date information, however, 
for four reasons. First, IQVIA reports only the month and year the drug is launched in the United 
States, so (for instance) it fails to distinguish between January 1 and January 31, which could be 
material for some analysis we perform. Second, we requested (and IQVIA provided) launch 
information only for drugs for which a patent had been restored by the spring 2017. Third, for some 
of these drugs, IQVIA lacked the data in question. Fourth, in several cases the launch date was not 
useable in our analysis. Launch dates before approval were treated as error. Launch dates more than 
six months after product approval were flagged for follow-up. In a handful of cases, follow-up in 
other sources typically trade press or securities filings revealed a reason not to rely on the IQVIA 
date for purposes of the planned analysis. To give an example, Cesamet (nabilone) was launched, but 
then acquired by a second company and relaunched, and IQVIA reported only the relaunch date. In 
this case, the IQVIA date was excluded. For quality assurance, the generic drug launch dates were 
also compared with information from FDA s website about the timing of first generic approval, and 
other sources (such as trade press and securities filings) were used to investigate discrepancies. In a 
handful of cases, investigation led to exclusion of the IQVIA information. 
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thirty years provides a basis for robust description of average clinical trial 
program length, effective patent life before patent term restoration, and 
the impact of patent term restoration. The average clinical development 
program in the dataset is 6.04 years (median 5.29 years). This is consistent 
with the findings of an earlier paper in this series, based on a smaller 
dataset that excluded biologics and ended one year earlier, which found 
an average of 5.96 years (median 5.23 years).144 
In this dataset, average effective patent life without restoration
meaning the time from FDA approval to the original expiration date of the 
patent is 8.71 years (median 9.49 years). This is somewhat shorter than 
the average effective patent life reported in empirical studies that 
supported patent term restoration in the first place.145 Whether effective 
patent life (before restoration) has changed over time is more complex. 
The average effective patent life of patents in the dataset has increased 
over the passage of time, in the sense that patents in the dataset issued in 
the later years of the interval studied have more life remaining after FDA 
approval than patents issued in the earlier years of the interval studied. As 
Figure 1 in the Appendix shows, patents in the dataset issued in the 1980s 
tended to have eight to ten years of life remaining after FDA approval, 
and patents issued in the 2000s tended to have (or, if not expired, tend to 
have) ten to twelve years of life remaining. But the average effective 
patent life for the drugs in the dataset has not increased over time: drugs 
approved in recent years tend to have around the same average effective 
patent life as drugs approved at the beginning of the interval studied. As 
Figure 2 shows, drugs approved in the 1980s tended to average eight to 
ten years of effective patent life, as did drugs approved in the 1990s and 
drugs approved in the 2000s. 
The average amount of patent life restored in this dataset was 1,049 
days or 2.87 years (median 944 days, or 2.59 years). Others have reported 
similar numbers.146 This does not represent the average that one would 
                                                     
144. Lietzan, supra note 38, at 88. The finding is also consistent with the findings of other scholars. 
See, e.g., Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry s 
Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 206 (2010) (noting that the three clinical 
development phases take 1.5, 2.5 and 2.5 years, respectively, and the phase from submission to launch 
requires another eighteen months); KI Kaitin & JA DiMasi, Pharmaceutical Innovation in the 21st 
Century: New Drug Approvals in the First Decade, 2000–2009, 89 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 183,187 (2010) (noting that the average clinical development time for drugs approved 
between 2005 and 2009 was 6.4 years). 
145. See SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 83, at 173 (reporting that average effective patent life for new 
drugs had dropped to 12.4 years by the early 1970s); Eisman & Wardell, supra note 83, at 20 (finding 
that the average had dropped to 9.5 years by 1979).  
146. For instance, Professors Beall, Darrow, and Kesselheim reported a median restoration of 2.75 
years in the eighty-three drugs of their dataset that received patent term restoration. Beall et al., supra 
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expect under current law, because 113 drugs in the dataset were subject to 
the two-year cap.147 With these drugs omitted, the average restoration for 
the remaining 529 drugs is 1,117 days or 3.06 years.148 The average 
effective patent life in the dataset after patent term restoration is 11.58 
years (median 12.83 years).149 This average is consistent with earlier 
reports examining drugs approved in the 1990s but lower than a figure 
reported for recently approved top-selling drugs.150 Figure 3 in the 
Appendix shows that average effective patent life after restoration has not 
meaningfully changed since the late 1980s and that it varies less than 
effective patent life before restoration. 
C. The Determinants of Effective Patent Life 
We hypothesized that longer premarket research and development 
programs would lead to shorter effective patent life. We also hypothesized 
that because the statute does not restore every day of patent life lost to 
premarket testing, this effect would still be evident today. To assess these 
questions, we performed a series of regressions to identify the 
determinants of effective patent life both before and after the PTO applies 
                                                     
note 25, at 20. In 1996, Professors Grabowski and Vernon found that the average patent term 
extension for new drugs coming to the market in the 1991 to 1993 period was 2.3 years. Henry 
Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the US: The 
Waxman-Hatch Act After One Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS 110, 119 20, 121 (1996). And in 
1998, the Congressional Budget Office reported that the fifty-one new drugs approved between 1992 
and 1995 that enjoyed patent term restoration received an average of 2.9 years. CONG. BUDGET OFF., 
HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 40 (July 1998). In 2008, however, Charles Clift reported that twenty-
six of the top forty best-selling drugs in 2006 benefitted from patent term restoration and received an 
average of 3.6 years. Charles Clift, The Value of Patent Term Extensions to the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in the USA, 5 J. GENERIC MED. 201, 205 06 (2008). 
147. This includes two pipeline drugs with patents that expired before FDA approval, which 
therefore received two years of effective patent life from the date of FDA approval. See supra 
section I.D. These were Corlopam (fenoldopam mesylate) and Remeron (mirtazapine).  
148.  In a counterfactual world in which only the five-year cap applied, the average restoration for 
the entire dataset of 642 drugs would have been 1,186 days or 3.25 years. 
149. As discussed in section IV.C., however, if the two-year cap had not applied to 18% of the 
dataset, meaning in a counterfactual world in which only the five-year cap applied, the average would 
have been higher.  
150. See Beall et al., supra note 25, at 21 (examining the 170 best-selling new drugs that 
experienced generic market entry between 2000 and 2012 and reporting a median effective patent life 
of 13.25 years for the eighty-three that received patent term restoration). But see Grabowski & 
Vernon, supra note 146, at 120 (reporting that new chemical entities approved from 1991 to 1993 had 
an average effective patent life, after restoration, of 11.8 years, which the authors claimed in 1996 
was probabl  representative of the average patent lives  of new chemical entities then coming onto 
the market); CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 146, at 40 (reporting 11.5 years for the fifty-one new 
drugs approved between 1992 and 1995 that enjoyed patent term restoration). 
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patent term restoration.151 
1. Effective Patent Life Before Patent Term Restoration 
Using our full dataset of 642 observations, we performed regression 
analysis to assess which variables explain effective patent life before the 
award of patent term restoration (Regression 1).152 This regression had 
high explanatory power; in statistical terms, the adjusted R2 was 0.84. In 
simple English, this means that 84% of the variation in the dependent 
variable (effective patent life) was explained by the independent variables 
found to have explanatory power. The results for Regression 1 appear in 
Table 1 in the Appendix and are summarized here. 
Certain variables had negative coefficients, meaning that as they 
increase the effective patent life decreases. To begin with, the length of 
time between the patent (or if applicable, parent patent) filing date and the 
start of clinical trials was negatively correlated with effective patent life. 
We treat this period as a rough proxy for the preclinical testing period.153 
The length of the clinical testing period was also negatively correlated 
with effective patent life. In statistical terms, the coefficients were small 
but strongly statistically significant which means that the impact was 
small but unlikely to be a matter of chance.154 We expected these results. 
We also investigated the possibility that certain therapeutic categories 
were negatively correlated with effective patent life before restoration and 
found that only one category (antipsychotics) had explanatory power. We 
did not expect this result. We discuss these findings in Part IV.  
We also assessed several independent variables relating to the type of 
                                                     
151. A regression analysis is a statistical process for mathematically establishing the relationships 
between variables and estimating their impact. In a regression analysis, the dependent variable is the 
main factor that one is trying to understand or predict, and the independent variables are factors 
believed to have an impact on the dependent variable. Several approaches can be used. The Appendix 
describes the regression models used.  
152. This was an ordinary least squares regression. Details can be found in the Appendix.  
153. For this calculation, the filing date is the date that controlled (or would have controlled) 
calculation of the twenty-year patent term. See sources cited supra note 131. Our goal was to identify 
a date on which it could reasonably be concluded the company had begun preclinical testing. But this 
period is a rough proxy for the preclinical testing period for at least two reasons. First, the preclinical 
testing will usually have usually begun before this filing date. See supra note 72. Second, the patent 
in question might not be the earliest filed patent or the active ingredient patent.  
154. The coefficient for this variable (length of the proxy-preclinical  testing period) was negative 
but numerically low (-0.0018). In simple terms, the coefficient value represents how much of the 
dependent variable (here the effective patent life, measured in days) changes, with a one unit shift in 
the independent variable (here length of proxy-preclinical  testing, measured in days), if the other 
independent variables are held constant. For the length of the clinical testing period, the coefficient 
was again low, -0.0016. The p-values  for both independent variables in simple terms the 
probability that the results occurred by chance were below 0.000. 
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patent and patent term, with varying results. On the one hand, the 
following were positively correlated with effective patent life before 
restoration: (1) a child patent, (2) a patent with a seventeen-year term 
because of the URAA transition provisions, (3) a patent with a twenty-
year term because of the URAA transition provisions, and (4) a patent 
with a post-URAA twenty-year term. In fact, they were very strongly 
correlated. On the other hand, (1) a child patent with a transitional twenty-
year term, and (2) a child patent with a post-URAA twenty-year term were 
strongly negatively correlated with effective patent life before the 
restoration award. These findings are unsurprising and are discussed 
in Part IV.  
The number of days restored by the PTO was negatively correlated with 
effective patent life before restoration. This makes sense, because the 
restoration award is based on the number of days lost. The coefficient was, 
however, quite small (-0.0017), meaning the impact was small. Imposition 
of the two-year cap on the restoration award was strongly negatively 
correlated with effective patent life (before restoration). The reasons for 
this are unclear but may relate to the fact that the two-year cap applied 
only to patents issued before September 24, 1984, covering drugs already 
in clinical trials. More than three quarters (86 of 113, or 76%) of these 
patents had been filed in the 1960s or 1970s, which suggests that the drugs 
in question had unusually long overall research and 
development programs. 
2. Effective Patent Life After Patent Term Restoration 
We performed five statistical regressions to assess which variables 
explain effective patent life after patent term restoration, that is, final 
effective patent life. Regression 2 included the full dataset, 642 
observations, while Regressions 3 through 6 examined subsets of the data 
defined by patent term. We isolated these subsets to establish whether the 
determinants of effective patent life differ by patent term regime (pre-
URAA, post-URAA, or transitional). 
Regression 2 examined the determinants of final effective patent life in 
the entire dataset of 642 observations.155 Regression 3 examined the 
determinants of final effective patent life in the subset of 314 observations 
with a seventeen-year patent term.156 This comprises sixty-five 
observations subject to the pre-URAA patent term regime and 249 
observations that received seventeen-year terms by operation of the 
                                                     
155. This was a right-censored tobit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix. 
156. This was a right-censored tobit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix. 
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URAA transition provisions. Regression 4 examined the determinants of 
effective patent life after patent term restoration in the subset of 328 
observations with a twenty-year patent term.157 This comprises 150 
observations subject to the post-URAA patent term regime and 178 
observations subject to twenty-year terms by operation of the URAA 
transition provisions. Regression 5 examined the determinants of final 
effective patent life in the subset of 150 observations with a post-URAA 
twenty-year patent term.158 Regression 6 examined the determinants of 
final effective patent life in the subset of ninety-five observations to which 
the five-year cap applied.159 
Several key finds emerged from the results of these regressions, which 
are detailed in Table 1 of the Appendix. First, in Regression 2, which 
considered the entire dataset of 642 observations, the determinants of final 
effective patent life were virtually the same as the determinants of 
effective patent life before restoration with the exception that one would 
expect: the number of days restored.160 Thus a longer clinical period was 
associated with a shorter final effective patent life, as was a longer proxy-
preclinical period, although here too the association was weak. Selecting 
a child patent subject to the post-URAA twenty-year term had the most 
powerful negative influence on final patent life (but overall, selecting a 
patent subject to the twenty-year term had a strongly positive impact). 
Selecting a patent subject to the transition provisions (i.e., a patent for 
which the more favorable of the two term calculations applied) had the 
most powerful positive influence on final effective patent life. The 
independent variables in this regression explained 36% of the variation in 
final effective patent life. 
Second, in every regression, the length of the proxy-preclinical period 
and the length of the clinical period had negative explanatory power. That 
is, as these periods got longer, the final effective patent life (after patent 
term restoration) consistently got shorter. We expected this. And in each 
regression, again, the coefficients were small but strongly statistically 
significant meaning that the impact was small but unlikely to be a matter 
of chance.161 In every regression, other independent variables played a 
                                                     
157. This was a right-censored tobit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix. 
158. This was a right-censored tobit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix. 
159. This was an ordinary least squares regression. Details can be found in the Appendix. 
160. Because the number of days restored is proportional to the number of days lost, it should be 
negatively correlated with effective patent life before patent term restoration and positively correlated 
with effective patent life after restoration. 
161. The coefficient for this variable (length of the proxy-preclinical  testing period) was negative 
but numerically low (-0.0018). For the length of the clinical testing period, the coefficient was again 
low, -0.0016. The p-values  for both independent variables were below 0.000. 
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more powerful role in driving the final effective patent life typically 
variables relating to the patent selected for restoration. 
Third, therapeutic categories were generally not correlated with final 
effective patent life (that is, after restoration). There were a handful of 
exceptions. In Regressions 2 and 6, the antipsychotic drug therapeutic 
category, alone, had explanatory power. This category is negatively 
correlated with final effective patent life. In Regression 3, which 
examined the subset of patents with a seventeen-year patent term (through 
pre-URAA terms or transition provisions), ten therapeutic categories (of 
the thirty-eight total) were negatively correlated with final effective patent 
life. In Regression 4, the subset of patents with a twenty-year patent term 
(through the URAA or the transition provisions), analgesic drugs were 
strongly negatively corrected with final effective patent life, while three 
other categories (gastrointestinal drugs, immunological agents, and 
hormonal agents) were positively correlated with final effective patent 
life. Finally, in Regression 5, the subset of patents subject only to the post-
URAA regime, analgesic drugs were strongly negatively correlated with 
final effective patent life, while antiemetics and hormonal agents were 
positively correlated. However, on the whole therapeutic categories 
associated with long clinical programs were not associated with shorter 
final effective patent life. We did not expect this result and discuss it in 
section IV.B.162 
Fourth, the results for child patents were complex but generally 
confirmed our instincts. We expected that selecting a child patent for 
restoration would be associated with longer final effective patent life 
when a seventeen-year patent term applied, but not when the twenty-year 
term applied. As noted, selecting a child patent subject to the post-URAA 
twenty-year term had a powerful, highly significant, negative influence 
on final effective patent life, both before restoration and with restoration. 
In the subset of 328 observations with patents that have a twenty-year term 
(through the URAA or the transition provisions) Regression 4 having 
a child patent was not uncorrelated correlated with final effective patent 
life. In the subset of 314 observations with seventeen-year patent terms 
(through the pre-URAA law or the transition provisions)
Regression 3 none of the child patent variables had explanatory power. 
In the case of Regression 5, which considered the subset of 150 
observations with the post-URAA twenty-year patent term (i.e., no 
transitional terms): having a child patent was somewhat negatively 
                                                     
162. Of the 418 instances (thirty-eight therapeutic categories in eleven regressions) in which 
therapeutic categories could be significant, only twenty-six of these variables have any explanatory 
power, a mere 6.2%. Moreover, of these twenty-six, fifteen are significant at the 10% level, nine are 
significant at the 5% level, and only two are significant at the 1% level.  
Acri & Lietzan (Do Not Delete) 10/27/2020  4:49 PM 
1352 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1317 
 
correlated with final effective patent life. Finally, in the subset of ninety-
five observations subject to the five-year cap Regression 6 having a 
child patent was negatively correlated with final effective patent life, but 
having a child patent with a seventeen-year transitional term or a twenty-
year term (whether through the URAA or the transition provisions) was 
strongly positively correlated with final effective patent life. We discuss 
these results in section IV.A.  
3. Fourteen-Year Effective Patent Life 
We performed two additional regressions with the entire dataset of 642 
observations to answer the same question in a different way, focusing on 
variables that dictate whether a drug enjoys the full fourteen years of 
effective patent life possible under section 156. In our dataset, 215 drugs 
(33.5%) reached the fourteen-year limit.163 Regression 7 sought to 
identify variables that determine the percentage of fourteen years 
achieved by a particular drug.164 Regression 8 sought to identify the 
variables that determine whether a drug comes close to reaching the 
fourteen-year limit specifically, within 10% of fourteen years thus, 
whether the final effective patent life was 12.6 or more years.165 Within 
our dataset, 334 drugs (52.0%) reached 12.6 years or more of final 
effective patent life. 
In both regressions, the length of the proxy-preclinical testing period 
and the length of the clinical period had negative explanatory power. That 
is, as these periods got longer, the percentage of fourteen years got shorter, 
and the chances of reaching at least 12.6 years got lower. But the actual 
impact was trivial. The independent variables selected for Regression 7 
explained 77% of the variability in the percentage of fourteen years 
achieved, and the most powerful determinants were in order of 
decreasing influence: (1) selection of a patent that would enjoy seventeen 
years through the transition provisions (positive), (2) selection of a patent 
                                                     
163. This is lower than the percentage reported by Beall for recently approved best-selling drugs. 
See Beall et al., supra note 25, at 21 (reporting that thirty-one drugs out of eighty-three, or 37%, in 
the sample had restored patent life reaching the fourteen-year limit). When the 113 drugs subject to 
the two-year cap are excluded from our dataset, 210 of the remaining 529 drugs (40%) hit the 
fourteen-year cap. This is much lower than the percentage reported by Beall. See id. (reporting that 
when drugs subject to the two-year cap were excluded from the analysis, the percentage rose to 
seventy (thirty-one of forty-four drugs)); see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 146, at 40 
( [A]bout half of the 43 drugs introduced between 1992 and 1995 that received Hatch-Waxman 
extensions and were not limited by the transitional cap had their extensions limited by the 14-year 
cap. ). 
164. This was an ordinary least squares regression. Details can be found in the Appendix. 
165. This was a probit regression. Details can be found in the Appendix. 
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under the new post-URAA patent regime (positive), (3) selection of a 
patent that would enjoy twenty years through the transition provisions 
(positive), (4) selection of a child patent subject to the twenty-year term 
(negative), (5) selection of a child patent (positive), (6) selection of a child 
patent subject to the twenty-year term through the transition provisions 
(negative), (7) application of the two-year cap (negative), and 
(8) selection of a child patent subject to a seventeen-year term through the 
transition provisions (negative). Regression 8 had low explanatory power, 
suggesting that omitted variables may have a fair amount to do with 
whether a drug hits at least 12.6 years.166 These findings are discussed in 
Part IV, and the full results appear in Table 2 in the Appendix. 
IV. DISCUSSION OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings in this study provide compelling support for some of the 
initial hypotheses, though not others. To begin with, as expected our legal 
system not only distorts patents but also provides less effective patent life 
for drugs that take longer to develop. The impact of the five-year cap on 
effective patent life turns out to be harder to unpack, though, possibly 
because more drugs in the dataset were subject to a no longer relevant 
two-year cap. And it turns out that therapeutic categories generally do not 
explain final effective patent life. The findings also raise an interesting 
question about the impact of the 1994 change in the patent term. When 
Congress enacted patent term restoration, however, lawmakers chose to 
allow restoration of child patents, because this would allow drug 
developers to reach fourteen years of effective patent life. Lawmakers 
changed how child patent terms are calculated, in 1994, without 
considering the impact on patent term restoration or incentives to develop 
new drugs. And as we expected, this change gutted the choice made 
in 1984. 
A. Distortion and Paradox 
The primary incentive to discover and develop a new drug is the 
prospect of a period for exclusive marketing made possible in part by the 
protection of patents associated with the drug.167 But by the time the 
federal government permits the inventor to commercialize the invention, 
                                                     
166. The adjusted R2 was 0.65, meaning that only 65% of the variation in the dependent variable 
(here, whether the final term was 12.6 years or higher) is explained by the independent variables 
found to have explanatory power. 
167. See supra section I.B. 
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much of the patent term has already lapsed. In the years before enactment 
of section 156, effective patent life for drugs had dropped to 9.5 years.168 
Many who supported patent term restoration not only drug patent 
owners but the FDA, the PTO, and academic economists grounded their 
arguments in this distortion, citing the length of premarket testing 
programs, the shortening of effective patent life, and concerns about the 
incentive to innovate.169 
Our legal system does not merely distort patents, however; it 
paradoxically provides less incentive (truncates the patent more) when a 
drug takes more time to develop. We call this the innovation paradox, and 
we hypothesized that it would be readily apparent when examining the 
drugs in our dataset before the PTO extended their patent terms. And it 
was. Moreover, because the 1984 law does not restore every day of patent 
life lost to premarket research and development, we hypothesized that the 
paradox would still be evident today. And it is. The paradox was apparent 
in every regression considering the determinants of final effective patent 
life. In every regression, a longer clinical period was associated with a 
shorter final effective patent life, and a longer period between patent filing 
and clinical trials was associated with a shorter final effective patent life. 
Although the magnitude of the impact was very small, the results were 
strongly statistically significant, confirming our hypothesis that longer 
premarket research and development programs lead to shorter effective 
patent life, even with patent term restoration in place.170 
Our findings also show that the type of patent restored child or parent, 
subject to the seventeen-year term or the twenty-year term has played a 
powerful role in determining final effective patent life. This merits 
reflection, because Congress chose in 1984 to allow companies to select 
the patent for restoration, and because it later amended the patent term 
without considering the effect of the change on patent term restoration. 
When Congress enacted patent term restoration in 1984, it assumed a 
simple world. The patent term lasted for seventeen years from issuance. 
In August 1984, Senator Hatch and Representative Waxman brokered a 
series of final changes to the pending legislation, to secure the drug 
                                                     
168. Eisman & Wardell, supra note 83, at 20. 
169. See generally Lietzan, supra note 79, at 111 25 (discussing the legislative efforts relating to 
patent term restoration from the early 1980s through the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman 
amendments).  
170. In several regressions, specific years of marketing approval also had explanatory power. For 
instance, in Regression 2 (determinants of final effective patent life in the entire dataset), every year 
of FDA approval between 1985 and 2014, inclusive, was correlated with shorter effective patent life, 
with the coefficient varying from -1.76 (1985) to -4.14 (2010). This indicates that relative to the base 
year of 1984, patents on drugs approved in subsequent years had shorter final effective patent lives.  
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industr s support (and tacit agreement not to challenge an aspect of the 
legislation that raised constitutional issues).171 Chief among these changes 
was the elimination of language that limited patent term restoration to the 
first-issued patent on the drug.172 This language had reflected objections 
to the restoration of continuation patents,173 and its elimination would 
make it possible for a company to reach fourteen years of effective patent 
life with a child patent.174 And that was the point.175 It would be possible 
to reach fourteen years with a child patent because of the seventeen-year 
patent term. In this simple world, if a patent issued after clinical trials 
began, less of the clinical period would be eligible for restoration.176 If 
this patent was a child patent, though, it had a later original expiry date 
than earlier-issued patents, which meant that the smaller number of days 
would be added to a later original expiry date. And because the PTO 
restored only 50% of the time spent in trials, restoring this later-issuing 
child patent would always mean a longer final effective patent life than 
restoring an earlier-issuing patent of either type. 
Congress changed how patent terms would be calculated in 1995, 
and simply as a mathematical matter gutted the August 1984 decision. 
Once the URAA takes full effect that is, once drug companies have only 
post-URAA patents from which to select every patent that could be 
proposed for restoration will enjoy a twenty-year term starting on its 
application date or its parent s application date. As alread  explained, a 
later-filed patent will generally issue later, so less of the clinical period 
will be eligible for restoration. But in this new world, if the later-filed 
patent is a child patent, it will not have a later original expiration date (to 
add this smaller restoration to). In other words, the company can no longer 
use a continuation patent to ensure it receives fourteen years of final 
effective patent life as envisioned in the final round of negotiations 
in 1984. 
Our results, though complex, generally confirm this gutting. To begin 
with, selecting a child patent is positively associated with nearing the 
fourteen-year limit on effective patent life even though selecting a child 
patent with a transitional term (of either sort) or a child patent with a 
twenty-year term is negatively associated with nearing the limit 
                                                     
171. Lietzan, supra note 79, at 105 06. 
172. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived 
Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 389, 404 05 (1999).  
173. See Lietzan, supra note 79, at 88. 
174. Id. at 106. 
175. Id. 
176. See supra Part II. 
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(Regression 7). These findings provide powerful confirmation of the 
value of selecting a child patent in the remaining (alternative) scenario: 
when the pre-URAA seventeen-year term applied.177 This is precisely 
what Congress intended in 1984. In contrast, selecting a child patent for 
restoration is associated with a shorter final effective patent life in the case 
of a child patent with a twenty-year term, either through a transitional term 
or post-URAA (Regressions 1 and 2). This is precisely the opposite of 
what Congress intended in 1984.178 
The nature of the patent term restoration formula makes it impossible 
to draw robust conclusions about the impact of the URAA using this 
dataset.179 Although the URAA took effect in June 1995, and indeed 
applied in a sense retroactively (by applying transition provisions to 
patents then in force), in another sense even now it is not fully in place for 
the patent term restoration purposes. Only one-quarter of the restored 
patents in our dataset (150 patents, or 23%) were post-URAA patents. 
And in this subset, none of the patent-related independent variables has 
explanatory power. Only sixty-five patents in the dataset (10%) were 
subject to the pre-URAA scheme.180 A comparison of the average final 
                                                     
177. In Regression 7, which uses the full set of 642 observations to examine the percent of the 
fourteen years achieved, selecting a child patent with a transitional seventeen-year term was 
negatively associated with nearing the fourteen-year limit. Such a patent would be assigned the 
seventeen-year term simply because applying the twenty-year term was less advantageous. This 
would be true the old calculation would have been more favorable if the parent application had 
been filed more than three years before the PTO issued the child patent. It is possible the lapse of time 
between parent and child applications reflects a longer overall premarket research and development 
process, which could help to explain the negative association with getting close to fourteen years. But 
we did not test this in our regressions. 
178. Regression 5 complicates the picture. This considered the determinants of final effective 
patent life in the 150 observations subject to the post-URAA patent term, and it found that a child 
patent had no explanatory power. This likely reflects the fact that section 156 allows a company to 
select any patent for restoration. In the pre-URAA period, a company could choose a child patent in 
order to achieve fourteen years. Although this strategy is unlikely to work in the post-URAA world, 
the company would presumably avoid selecting a child patent that would work to its disadvantage.  
179. The text addresses whether the URAA eliminated the intended benefit of selecting a child 
patent for restoration. The URAA could have had another negative impact on effective patent life, 
but enactment of patent term adjustment applicable to patent applications filed after May 29, 2000
should have offset that impact as follows. The URAA would ordinarily lead to shorter effective patent 
life than prior law if a patent application was pending at the PTO for more than three years, because 
in this case twenty years from the application would end earlier than seventeen years from issuance. 
When patent term adjustment applies, however, delay beyond the three years is generally added back 
day for day. See sources cited supra note 118. Suppose the patent issues during the clinical trials. The 
company may seek patent term restoration for all days in trials after patent issuance, though it will be 
limited to 50% recovery. If the patent was delayed at the PTO, it may also recover those days, but it 
will receive them in full. 
180. The vast majority of the patents in our dataset 427 patents, or 68% were subject to the 
URAA transition rules. 
 
Acri & Lietzan 08 Lietzan and Acri-10-27(Do Not Delete) 10/27/2020  4:49 PM 
2020] DISTORTED DRUG PATENTS 1357 
 
effective patent life in the two groups 12.48 years for post-URAA 
patents and 7.36 years for pre-URAA patents would not tell us the 
impact of the URAA, because 74% of the pre-URAA patents were also 
subject to the two-year cap, which no longer applies. In an attempt to 
better understand the impact of the URAA, however, we recalculated 
patent term restoration in the counterfactual world in which Congress did 
not change the patent term and did not enact patent term adjustment.181 In 
this counterfactual world, the average effective patent life in our dataset 
after restoration would have been 11.61 years, which is not meaningfully 
different from the average in the real world (11.58 years).182 
Within a few years, every company with a recently approved drug or 
biologic will hold only patents subject to the twenty-year term.183 At this 
point, it will no longer be possible to obtain fourteen years of effective 
patent life on a continuation patent through application of patent term 
restoration. A very short research and development program will always 
have the potential to yield fourteen years of effective patent life. 
Otherwise the path to a fourteen-year effective patent life will be different: 
use of a later-issued original patent.184 But whether this patent will 
effectively preclude approval and launch of a generic or biosimilar copy 
is another question.185 These are issues that Congress did not consider in 
1995. A review of the legislative history suggests no attention was paid to 
the relationship between the new patent term and the formula for patent 
term restoration.186 
                                                     
181. This counterfactual has limitations. For instance, we changed no other variables and thus 
assumed that the PTO took the same amount of time to issue the patent. We also assumed the company 
would have selected the same patent for restoration. 
182. The median would have been higher (13.05 years, instead of 12.83 years).  
183. Only one of the six drugs in our dataset approved by FDA in 2015 the latest year for which 
we have data had a transition patent restored. Only two of the thirteen approved in 2014 had a 
transition patent restored. And although our study does not cover new drugs approved in subsequent 
years, only two new chemical entities approved in 2018 are covered by composition of matter or 
method of use patents with transitional terms. 
184. This could explain why the results in the counterfactual world are not meaningfully different 
from the results in the real world. So long as the PTO issued those original patents within three years 
of the patent application, the initial and restored patent expiry dates would not have been significantly 
different had the pre-URAA regime applied. 
185. These will not be active ingredient patents, which are the most likely to block approval of an 
abbreviated application. See supra section I.B.; see also Henry Grabowski et al., Pharmaceutical 
Patent Challenges: Company Strategies and Litigation Outcomes, 3 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 33, 40 
(2017) ( Most often, firms will then apply for patent term extension on their key active ingredient 
patent, since this provides the broadest scope of patent protection and frequently expires earlier than 
any non-AI patents. ). 
186. Although policymakers may have discussed the relationship between the URAA and patent 
term restoration, we found no evidence of these discussions in the following legislative materials: 
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B. Role of Therapeutic Category 
We expected that some therapeutic categories would be associated with 
shorter effective patent life. Studies before enactment of section 156 had 
noted that effective patent life varied by therapeutic category,187 but the 
policymaking discussions related to design of section 156 did not take this 
into account.188 Clinical program length has continued to vary by 
                                                     
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 103-
826, pt. 1 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 103-826, pt. 2 (1994); H.R. Res. 564, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. REP. 
NO. 103-829 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-412 (1994); H.R. DOC. NO. 103-195 (1994); H.R. DOC. 
NO. 103-316, vol. 1 (1994); H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, vol. 2 (1994); Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
103d Cong. (1993); Trade Agreements Resulting from the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means and Its Subcomm. on Trade, 103d 
Cong. (1994); GATT: The Experts View: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Pol y, Trade & 
Env t of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 103d Cong. (1994); Review of the Uruguay Round GATT 
Agreement Implications for Agriculture Trade: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 103d Cong. 
(1994); Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., 
Consumer Prot., & Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 103d Cong. (1994); GATT 
Subsidies Code and Its Impact on R&D: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Env t & Aviation of 
the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 103d Cong. (1994); World Trade Organization: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 103d Cong. (1994); Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong. (1994); General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Lab. & Hum. Res., 103d Cong. (1994); Results 
of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 103d Cong. 
(1994); GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 
103d Cong. (1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE 
CHAIRMAN S REMARKS RELATING TO THE FINANCING OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY 
ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) (Comm. Print 
1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., POSSIBLE PROPOSALS TO FINANCE THE 
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (Comm. 
Print 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., DESCRIPTIONS OF PROPOSALS 
RELATING TO FINANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) AS APPROVED BY THE S. COMM. ON FIN. 
(Comm. Print 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., ESTIMATES OF FINANCING 
PACKAGE FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 
TRADE (Comm. Print 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., STAFF 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TENTATIVELY AGREED TO ITEMS IN FINANCING PACKAGE FOR THE 
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (Comm. 
Print 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS FOR FIN. 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) (Comm. Print. 1994); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX N, 103D CONG., 
FINANCING FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 
TRADE (GATT) (Comm. Print 1994).  
187. See, e.g., Leonard G. Schifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 
1962 Drug Regulations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 91, 116 (1982) (showing the decline in average 
effective patent life from 1966 to 1969 and from 1970 to 1973 by therapeutic area, and showing that 
diuretics and cardiovascular drugs and anti-inflammatory agents were the hardest hit (citing 
SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 83, at 173)).  
188. See generally Lietzan, supra note 79, at 1112 25 (providing history of the Hatch-Waxman 
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therapeutic category.189 Because the formula did not account for this, and 
because it does not restore every day of patent life lost to premarket 
research and development, we expected that therapeutic categories would 
be associated with shorter effective patent life both before and 
after restoration. 
The therapeutic categories in our dataset vary in effective patent life 
without restoration: from an average of 4.51 years (eight antipsychotics) 
to an average of 11.91 years (six antimigraine agents). In addition to 
antipsychotics, sleep disorder agents, anticonvulsants, vaccines, 
analgesics, and antidepressants average seven or fewer years of effective 
patent life remaining at the time of FDA approval. In addition to 
antimigraine agents, antivirals, diagnostic agents, dermatological agents, 
and anesthetics average ten or more years of patent life remaining. Most 
categories had large ranges. For instance, antibacterials ranged from -0.76 
years to 13.86 years; antidepressants ranged from -1.5 years to 13.96 
years, and cardiovascular drugs ranged from -2.7 years to 13.8 years. Final 
effective patent life after restoration varies less by therapeutic category 
(as it does less in general), ranging again from antipsychotics (8.29 years) 
and sleep disorder agents (9.61 years) at the low end to antiviral drugs 
(13.18 years) and antimigraine agents (13.74 years) at the high end. Final 
effective patent life still varies within each category; antibacterials, for 
instance, range from 3.69 years to the full fourteen years. These results 
appear in Table 3 in the Appendix. 
Although effective patent life before and after restoration varies by 
therapeutic category, our regressions showed that therapeutic category 
generally does not explain effective patent life. As noted, there were a few 
exceptions, but the explanatory power is not strong, and the statistical 
significance is not overwhelming.190 This may stem from the small 
number of observations in each therapeutic category, limiting the 
categor s explanator  power. But the value of the therapeutic category 
for empirical scholarship relating to innovation policy continues to be 
unclear. Therapeutic categories generally group drugs by body system or 
symptom targeted, rather than by disease or condition targeted, type of 
condition (acute or chronic), chemical class, mechanism of action, or 
physiological effect.191 As a result, many categories contain drugs that 
have in common only the body system targeted. Some categories are 
                                                     
Amendments, including section 156, based on exhaustive review of the legislative history). 
189. Lietzan, supra note 38, at 101 02. 
190. See supra section III.C. 
191. Littman, supra note 46, at 22; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PAVING THE WAY FOR 
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: FDA S ROLE IN A NEW ERA OF MEDICAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 17 
(2013). 
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wildly variable in both clinical trial length and effective patent life, 
suggesting that therapeutic category might not be the correct way to 
understand the effect of patent term distortion. It is convention in 
innovation policy to work by therapeutic category, but when focusing on 
the effect of research and development challenges and regulatory 
requirements, it may be more appropriate to focus on pharmacologic class 
instead.192 We did not capture this in our dataset. 
C. Impact of the Five-Year and Two-Year Caps 
Earlier work led us to suspect that the five-year cap exacerbates the 
distortion of patents by the regulatory framework. The cap means that 
once a clinical program reaches a certain length, any more testing will 
simply translate to lost patent life. We hypothesized that hitting the five-
ear cap would make a drug s final effective patent life shorter and less 
likely to reach the fourteen-year limit. 
The results were more nuanced. Application of the five-year cap had 
no explanatory power with respect to final effective patent life in the entire 
dataset (Regression 2) or the subset of observations with a seventeen-year 
patent term (Regression 3), nor did it explain the percentage of fourteen 
years attained by a patent owner in the full dataset (Regression 7). Even 
in the subset with a twenty-year patent term (Regression 4) and the subset 
with a post-URAA twenty-year patent term (Regression 5) subsets 
presumably more relevant to the impact of the scheme going forward
application of the five-year cap variable was uncorrelated with shorter 
final effective patent life. But application of the five-year cap is negatively 
correlated with reaching at least 12.6 years. No drug in the dataset that hit 
the five-year cap secured fourteen years of effective patent life. 
Interpretation of these results is complicated by the fact that more drugs 
in the dataset were subject to the two-year cap for transitional patents than 
the currently applicable five-year cap. Within our dataset of 642 drugs, 
ninety-five (15%) hit the five-year cap.193 (These drugs had an average 
effective patent life of 5.19 years before restoration and 10.20 years after 
restoration, lower than the overall population averages.) But if a product 
was already in clinical trials on September 24, 1984, then a patent issued 
before that date could receive no more than two years of patent term 
                                                     
192. See, e.g., Lietzan, supra note 38, at 105 06 (finding less variability in average clinical program 
length when drugs are classified by pharmacological class). 
193. This is consistent with Beall s findings. Beall et al., supra note 25, at 21 (reporting that thirteen 
of eighty-three drugs, or 15%, hit the five-year cap). When the drugs that hit the two-year cap are 
excluded from the analysis, however, 18% of the remaining drugs in our dataset (95 of 529) hit the 
five-year cap, compared to 30% (thirteen of forty-four) in Beall s dataset. Id. 
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restoration. This transition provision turned out to apply to 113 drugs
18% of the dataset including drugs approved well into the 1990s and 
indeed one approved in 2000.194 
Imposition of the transitional two-year cap has two implications. First, 
it means the discussion above understates the percentage of drugs likely 
to be affected by five-year cap going forward. In a counterfactual world 
in which Congress included only the five-year cap, 151 drugs (24% of the 
dataset) would have been subject to that cap. These drugs would have had 
a final effective patent life of 9.97 years. Second, imposition of the two-
year cap was negatively correlated with effective patent life in every 
regression in which the variable had explanatory power. This means it 
drives down effective patent life, so the average final effective patent life 
reported in this study 11.58 years for the entire dataset is lower than it 
would have been if only current law (the five-year cap) had applied. Had 
only the five-year cap applied, the dataset would have had an average final 
effective patent life of 11.96 years (median 13.16). In this world, the 
average final effective patent life for the 24% of drugs subject to the cap 
(9.97 years) would have been meaningfully shorter than the population 
average. 
D. Actual Exclusivity in the Market 
The findings in this Article relating to effective patent life will be 
important for scholars and policymakers focusing on drug innovation 
policy, but they are subject to one cautionary note. As opponents of patent 
term restoration pointed out in the late 1970s and early 1980s, effective 
patent life (of one patent, among many) is different from actual exclusivity 
in the market.195 Actual exclusivity is the time before launch of a generic 
copy (or a biosimilar, for a biologic). This period could be shorter than 
the effective life of the patent as reported in this dataset for instance, if 
the restored patent is later invalidated, or if patent infringement litigation 
leads to a settlement allowing the generic company to launch before patent 
expiry. It could be shorter if it is possible for a generic company to satisfy 
the generic drug approval standard without infringing the patent which 
might be the case, for example, if the patent selected for restoration covers 
                                                     
194. This was Mifeprex (mifepristone), approved by FDA for termination of early pregnancy in 
September 2000. 
195. See, e.g., Lietzan, supra note 79, at 83 84 (noting that when drug patent owners pushed for 
patent term restoration in the late 1970s and early 1980s, opponents such as Public Citizen argued 
that shortened effective patent life was irrelevant, because it did not correspond with actual exclusivity 
in the market). 
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the dosage form, formulation, or manufacturing process.196 Actual 
exclusivity could also be longer than the effective patent life reported in 
this dataset.197 It could be longer if the market for the drug is too small to 
attract generic competitors. It could be longer if the drug is difficult (or 
expensive) to make, or too complex for proposed copies to meet the 
generic drug approval standard (which requires a showing that the active 
ingredients of the two drugs are the same). Or there could be other 
intellectual property effectively preventing generic competition, including 
later-expiring patents. 
Whether effective patent life corresponds to actual market exclusivity 
is important but focusing on actual market exclusivity may miss the 
point. The distortion of drug patent life by federal regulatory requirements 
raises concerns because our legal system uses the promise of patent 
protection to encourage the discovery and development of new drugs.198 
Even if the life of the restored patent turns out not to dictate the timing of 
actual generic launch, when a company is starting clinical trials in our 
dataset, an average of 19.58 years before the final (restored) patent 
expiry the factors affecting market exclusivity may be unknown and 
actual market exclusivity impossible to predict. The company does not 
even know whether the trials will succeed, and in fact chances are the 
trials will not.199 Patent life is more certain; when one applies for a patent, 
one generally knows (subject to delay at the PTO and patent term 
adjustment) what the expiration date will be. Even though a company does 
not know how long its clinical program will take, it knows that if the drug 
is approved, it will have whatever remains of the patent life plus as many 
as five more years to make up for time lost to research and development. 
                                                     
196. The FDA will approve a generic drug if it has the same active ingredient, route of 
administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as its reference product, and if it is bioequivalent 
to that reference product. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4). In addition, if the agency has approved a special 
petition (known as a suitability petition ) from the generic manufacturer, it will approve a generic 
copy with a different route of administration, dosage form, or strength. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii). It does 
not compare the manufacturing methods. Nor does the formulation have to be the same, although in 
some cases FDA will require the same inactive ingredients in the same concentration. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.94(a)(9) (2019). 
197. See, e.g., Ass n for Accessible Med., Comment Letter on Public Meeting Concerning the 
Administration of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 7
9 (Nov. 17, 2017), https://beta.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2017-N-3615-0097#collapseAttach 
mentMetadata-ember36 [https://perma.cc/2EAM-FGTR] (describing a variety of factors considered 
by generic companies when deciding whether to pursue a generic copy of a drug that has no patent 
protection). 
198. See supra section I.B. Patent protection provides this encouragement because it is designed to 
prevent competitors from making, using, or selling the invention for a fixed time period. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a). 
199. See sources cited supra note 54. 
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Potential effective patent life is thus more likely to be driving investment 
decisions at the beginning of the 19.58 years than is speculation about 
actual market exclusivity. 
We calculated the actual market exclusivity period meaning the time 
from new drug approval to generic drug launch for 227 of the 554 drugs 
in the dataset.200 Generic drug launch in this context means launch of a 
generic drug containing the same active ingredient, even if the generic 
drug approval was based on a different innovative product containing the 
same ingredient.201 The average exclusivity period was 12.62 years 
(median 13.28). This matches the findings of earlier studies.202 Another 
265 drugs had no generic launch as of the date we concluded data 
collection. Although it is tempting to consider the number of years since 
their FDA approval as their effective market exclusivity, many such as 
Posicor (mibefradil dihydrochloride), Normiflo (ardeparin sodium), 
Rezulin (troglitazone), and Manopax (flosequinan) were withdrawn 
from the market, including some for safety reasons (meaning that no 
generic could ever be approved).203 The numbers of years since FDA 
approval of these drugs cannot be construed as their effective 
market exclusivity. 
We performed three regressions to identify the determinants of actual 
market exclusivity. Regression 9 considered all 227 drugs for which we 
have generic launch data, Regression 10 considered the subset of 131 
drugs with seventeen-year patent terms, and Regression 11 considered the 
subset of ninety-six drugs with twenty-year patent terms. The results 
appear in Table 4 in the Appendix. Regressions 10 and 11 had no 
explanatory power and are not discussed further. In the 227 drugs for 
                                                     
200. IQVIA provided the launch dates. See supra note 143. For 265 drugs, IQVIA reported no 
generic launch to date. As explained in note 143, we dropped another six drugs because the dates 
were not useable in our analysis and fifty-six drugs for which IQVIA lacked data. 
201. This was necessary because the IQVIA data did not identify the innovative product on which 
the generic drug was based. 
202. See, e.g., Beall et al., supra note 25, at 20 (reporting average exclusivity in the market time 
to generic market entry as 13.75 years for eighty-three top-selling drugs, and identifying the quarter 
of generic market entry as the one in which a prescription for a therapeutically equivalent generic 
drug appeared in Medicaid prescription data aggregated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
data); Bo Wang et al., Research Letter: Variations in Time of Market Exclusivity Among Top-Selling 
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 635 (2015) (finding median 
market exclusivity period of 12.5 years for the 175 drugs that experienced generic competition by the 
end of 2012, out of the 437 top-selling drugs by sales in the United States between 2000 and 2011, 
also using Medicaid prescription data as proof of generic competition); Henry Grabowski et al., 
Updated Trends in US Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, 19 J. MED. ECON. 207 (2014) 
(finding that non-biologic drugs experiencing initial generic entry in 2011 2012 had enjoyed 12.9 
years of actual exclusivity in the market, using IQVIA data to confirm generic launch).  
203. We did not attempt to identify every drug withdrawn from the market. 
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which we have generic launch data, the final effective patent life after 
restoration is positively associated with actual market exclusivity 
(coefficient 0.44, p=0.024), as is the number of days of patent life restored 
(but the coefficient here is small). These were the only independent 
variables with explanatory power, and they explain only 22% of the 
variation in actual market exclusivity.204 
CONCLUSION 
The findings in this Article have significant policy implications. The 
two most significant results are as follows. First, in every regression, the 
length of the proxy-preclinical period and the length of the clinical period 
had negative explanatory power. As these periods got longer, the final 
effective patent life (after patent term restoration) consistently got shorter. 
The irony for inventors of new drugs is that drugs requiring more 
premarket investment (more years of research) may enjoy less patent life, 
in essence a distortion of the patent term. Second, with a handful of 
exceptions, therapeutic categories were generally not correlated with final 
effective patent life (that is, after restoration). It is convention in 
innovation policy to work by therapeutic category, but when focusing on 
the effect of research and development challenges and regulatory 
requirements, it may be more appropriate to focus on pharmacologic 
class instead. 
Longer clinical programs lead to shorter effective patent life, even after 
patent term restoration has been awarded. Although the impact is small, 
even a modest impact could be financially significant for an innovator. 
This finding contributes to a growing body of literature asking whether 
the U.S. legal system may be systematically skewing drug research 
incentives away from research programs that require a substantial 
investment of time. The decision to limit recovery to 50% of the days in 
clinical trials and, perhaps more importantly, to cap recovery at five years, 
may warrant reexamination. 
Other policy implications relate to the changes made to the patent term 
in 1994. Lawmakers in 1984 made a conscious choice to permit 
restoration of continuation patents so that drug companies could achieve 
fourteen years of effective patent life under section 156. The ability to 
choose a later-issued child patent helped mitigate the distorting effect of 
the premarket regulatory regime. This was possible because the patent 
term was calculated from patent issuance. Lawmakers in 1994 changed 
                                                     
204. Wang and colleagues found that median market exclusivity differed by therapeutic area, 
ranging from 14.8 years (dermatology products and antivirals) to 8.0 (analgesics). Wang et al., supra 
note 202, at 636. 
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how the patent term was calculated, and now a child patent is less likely 
to reach fourteen years. The decision to unravel the choice made in 
1984 if a conscious decision was even made was not vetted publicly. 
The consequences could be profound. 
Under the changes made in 1994, a drug company may need to select 
a later-issued original patent to achieve the same result: fourteen years of 
effective patent life. This patent is unlikel  to cover the drug s active 
ingredient; instead, it may cover another aspect of the drug such as its 
formulation. These patents ma  be inherentl  less valuable to the drug s 
inventor because it may be possible for generic and biosimilar applicants 
to develop copies that satisfy regulatory requirements for copies and yet 
do not infringe the patent. If these patents do not have the same value, the 
fourteen years of effective patent life is illusory. Policymakers effectively 
nullified the decision from 1984 without meaningful public discussion of 
the implications for drug innovation discussion that is therefore 
overdue. If instead these patents do preclude approval of generic and 
biosimilar applications, their use in this fashion is fully consistent with the 
intent of Congress in 1984, and public rhetoric about the insidious nature 
of later-issued drug patents should be recalibrated. 
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Average Effective Patent Life Without Restoration 
Over Time by Patent Issuance Date 
 
 
y = 1E-07x6 - 0.0016x5 + 8.1059x4 - 21545x3 + 3E+07x2 - 3E+10x + 9E+12 
R² = 0.9107 
 
Notes: 
Some drugs had negative effective patent life before restoration. To 
generate this figure, all negative values were replaced with zero. 
There is a potential for selection bias at the beginning and end of the 
interval studied, as follows. First, section 156 of the Patent Act did not 
take effect until September 1984, and the earliest approved drug in the 
dataset received FDA approval in August 1984. Any patent term 
restoration request relating to a patent issued in the 1970s necessarily 
related to a drug approved in August 1984 or later. These patents would 
have had an exceptionally short effective patent life. And other drugs with 
patents issued in the 1970s that reached the market more quickly will not 
appear in the dataset, because the earliest approved drugs were approved 
in August 1984. The information for these early patent issuance years will 
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life. The steep slope at the beginning of the interval studied is likely an 
artifact of enactment in 1984. Second, there may also be skewing in the 
final years of patent issuance. If a patent issued in the early 2010s and 
covers a drug that appears in our dataset, it necessarily covers a drug 
approved before November 2015. Meanwhile, other patents issued in the 
early 2010s will not appear in the dataset if the drugs in question are still 
in development. The information for these later patent issue years will be 
skewed to suggest a longer than warranted average effective patent life. 
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Figure 2: 
Average Effective Patent Life Without Restoration 




Some drugs had negative effective patent life before restoration. To 
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Figure 3: 
Average Effective Patent Life With Restoration 
Over Time by Patent Issuance Date 
 
 
y = 9E-08x6 - 0.001x5 + 5.1134x4 - 13610x3 + 2E+07x2 - 2E+10x + 5E+12 
R² = 0.9496 
 
Note:  
As was true of Figure 1, and for the same reasons, there is a potential 
for selection bias for patents issued in the earliest years shown and patents 
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Figure 4: 
Average Effective Patent Life With Restoration 
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Table 1: 
Determinants of Effective Patent Life Before Patent Term 
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when the patent 
is subject to the 
post-URAA 20-
year term  
Effective 





Observations 642 642 314 328 150 95 
Adjusted R2 0.84     0.68 
Pseudo R2  0.36 0.37 0.56 0.46  
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Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses 
underneath. Variables are identified as having explanatory power as 
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follows: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  
Linear regression attempts to model the relationship between variables 
by fitting a linear equation to observed data. This study utilizes a 
multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a statistical method 
of analysis, in order to estimate the relationship between a dependent 
variable and a collection of independent variables. The extent of 
explanatory power is measured by the Adjusted R2.  
Right-censoring tobit regressions estimate linear relationships between 
variables when there is censoring of a variable at an upper limit. This 
occurs when a value at or above some threshold, all take on the value of 
that threshold, so that the true value might be equal to the threshold, but it 
might also be higher. Accounting for the fact that the data is censored at 
the upper end provides a more accurate estimate, in cases where an OLS 
regression would be biased and inaccurate. The extent of explanatory 
power is measured by the Pseudo R2.  
The regressions used in this analysis were: 
Regression 1: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the 
effective patent life before restoration. The independent variables are 
listed in the second column of Table 1.  
Regression 2: In this right-censored tobit regression the dependent 
variable is the effective patent life with restoration. The independent 
variables are listed in the third column of Table 1. The regression included 
642 observations, 427 uncensored and 215 right-censored.  
Regression 3: In this right-censored tobit regression the dependent 
variable is the effective patent life with restoration when the patent had a 
17- year term (pre-URAA or transitional). The independent variables are 
listed in the fourth column of Table 1. Since the regression examines only 
patents that had a seventeen-year term, all variables associated with a 
twenty-year term are omitted. The regression included 314 observations, 
203 uncensored and 111 right-censored.  
Regression 4: In this right-censored tobit regression the dependent 
variable is the effective patent life with restoration when the patent has a 
twenty-year term (post-URAA or transitional). The independent variables 
are listed in the fifth column of Table 1. Since the regression examines 
only patents that had a twenty-year term, all variables associated with a 
seventeen-year term are omitted. In addition, in this subset of the data, 
since patents with post-URAA twenty-year term is perfectly correlated 
with patents with transitional twenty-year term, only one of the two 
variables can be included in the regression. Accordingly, the variable, 
patent with post-URAA twenty-year term, is omitted. The regression 
included 328 observations, 224 uncensored and 104 right-censored.  
Regression 5: In this right-censored tobit regression the dependent 
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variable is the effective patent life with restoration when the patent is 
subject to the post-URAA twenty-year term (i.e., no transitional terms). 
The independent variables are listed in the sixth column of Table 1. Given 
the relatively small sample size in this regression (150 observations), 
several variables were omitted due to their lack of explanatory power and 
correlation with other variables. The regression included 150 
observations, 100 uncensored and 50 right-censored.  
Regression 6: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the 
effective patent life with restoration when the five-year cap applies. The 
independent variables are listed in the last column of Table 1. Given the 
relatively small sample size in this regression (95 observations), several 
variables were omitted due to their lack of explanatory power and 
correlation with other variables.  
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Table 2: 
Determinants of Effective Patent Life With Restoration 
 
 Regression 7 (OLS) 
 
Regression 8 (Probit) 
 
Dependent variable Percent of 14 Years Achieved Whether the Final Effective 
Patent Life Was > 12.6 years 
Observations 642 629 
Adjusted R2 0.77  
Pseudo R2  0.65 
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 Regression 7 (OLS) 
 
Regression 8 (Probit) 
 
Therapeutic categories Antipsychotics 
-9.3821* 
(4.59) 


















Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses 
underneath. Variables are identified as having explanatory power as 
follows: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Regression 8 was run with the 
full dataset of 642 observations, but 13 observations were dropped due to 
their ability to perfectly predict either success or failure.  
Again, linear regression attempts to model the relationship between 
two variables by fitting a linear equation to observed data. This study 
utilizes a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a statistical 
method of analysis, in order to estimate the relationship between a 
dependent variable and a collection of independent variables.  
Statistically, a probit model is a type of regression in which the 
dependent variable can take only two values. In this case, the dependent 
variable is Whether the Final Effective Patent Life Was > 12.6 years, and 
the dependent variable is either 1  ( es, the final effective patent life was 
> 12.6 ears) or 0  (no, the final effective patent life was not > 
12.6 years).  
Specifically, the regressions used in this analysis were:  
Regression 7: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the 
Percent of 14 Years Achieved. The independent variables are listed in the 
second column of Table 2.  
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Regression 8: This is a probit regression. In this probit regression the 
dependent variable is a binary indicator of the Percent of fourteen Years 
Achieved. The dependent variables are listed in the second column of 
Table 2. In the case of thirteen observations, they either perfectly 
predicted success or failure and were therefore dropped.  
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Table 3: 
Average Effective Patent Life by Therapeutic Category 




Average Length of 




Patent Life Without 
Restoration in Years 
(Median) (Range) 
Average Effective 
Patent Life  
With Restoration in 
Years (Median) 
(Range) 














Analgesics (13) 6.76 (7)  
(2.61, 11.06) 
6.75 (7.01)  
(3.08,10.36) 
9.81 (10.98)  
(5.08, 13.72) 
















































































Antibacterials (48) 4.61 (4.41)  
(1.35, 17.25) 
9.11 (10.12)  
(-0.76, 13.86) 
11.79 (13.02)  
(3.69, 14.01) 
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Average Length of 




Patent Life Without 
Restoration in Years 
(Median) (Range) 
Average Effective 
Patent Life  
With Restoration in 
Years (Median) 
(Range) 














































Anesthetics (8) 5.32 (5.32)  
(2.68, 8.45) 
10.37 (11.39)  
(4.56, 13.67) 
12.53 (14.01)  
(7.09, 14.01) 










































This table includes only therapeutic categories with five or 
more observations. 
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Table 4: 
Determinants of Actual Market Exclusivity 
 
 Regression 9 (OLS) Regression 10 (OLS) Regression 11 (OLS)  
Dependent variable Actual market 
exclusivity in subset of 
drugs with generic 
launch data 
Actual market 
exclusivity in subset of 
drugs with generic 
launch data and 17-year 
patent terms 
Actual market 
exclusivity in subset of 
drugs with generic 
launch data and 20-year 
patent terms 
Observations 227 131 96 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.36      
No variables have any 
explanatory power 
-0.26 
The regression has no 
explanatory power 
Child patent Omitted Omitted 
 
Omitted 
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 Regression 9 (OLS) Regression 10 (OLS) Regression 11 (OLS)  
























Estimated coefficients are given with standard errors in parentheses 
underneath. Variables are identified as having explanatory power as 
follows: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Please note that the adjusted R2 
in Regression 11 likely results from a sample size that is too small and 
independent variables that are correlated. 
Again, linear regression attempts to model the relationship between 
two variables by fitting a linear equation to observed data. This study 
utilizes a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a statistical 
method of analysis, in order to estimate the relationship between a 
dependent variable and a collection of independent variables. The 
regression used in this analysis was: 
Regression 9: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the 
actual market exclusivity in the subset of drugs with generic launch data. 
The coefficients of the independent variables are listed in the second 
column of Table 4. 
Regression 10: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is actual 
market exclusivity in subset of drugs with generic launch data and 
seventeen-year patent terms. The coefficients of the independent variables 
are listed in the third column of Table 4. None of the independent 
variables have any explanatory power. 
Regression 11: In this OLS regression the dependent variable is the 
actual market exclusivity in subset of drugs with generic launch data and 
twenty-year patent terms. The coefficients of the independent variables 
are listed in the fourth column of Table 4. The regression has no 
explanatory power. 
 
 
